


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
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
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A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ANSELMO S. AVENIDO, JR.
Colonel, Philippines



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20. ABSTRACT

This study attempts to answer the following questions on the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah in 1979: (a) Did the armed forces do something that contributed to the causes which led the people of Iran to rise against the Shah? (b) When the demonstrations and riots were staged, did the armed forces manage the situation properly, or did they do something instead that worsened the situation? (c) When the period of final confrontation came, why did the armed forces fall to pieces after a mere three days of minor street fighting? (d) Relatedly, what lessons may be learned from what happened in Iran?

Investigation reveals that: (a) the Iranian armed forces contributed to the following causes of the revolution in varying degrees: brutality and other violations of human rights, corruption, economic hardships and excessive military expenditure, and cultural dislocation; (b) during the riots and demonstrations, the armed forces mishandled and exacerbated the situation through the following patterns: use of unnecessary force, resort to "military half-measures," loss of credibility, failure to "feel the pulse" of the people, and breakdown of discipline; (c) when the final three-day confrontation came, the armed forces had already lost their will to fight and the showdown only formalized their defeat; and (d) the lessons that may be learned from what happened in Iran are: it is not a sound policy for a leader to rely heavily on the backing of the armed forces without broadening the base of his support; national development must be balanced; in times of crisis, the leader must be decisive; the armed forces must be equipped and trained not only to fight against external aggression but to counter internal threats as well; the leader must be provided with accurate information as a basis for correct decisions; the people can be "pushed to the wall" up to a certain extent only; loyalty of the armed forces must not be to the leader alone but to the country above all else; and no armed forces personnel can be expected to massacre hundreds of their countrymen in a direct confrontation.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency.
(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE FALL OF THE SHAH, by Colonel Anselmo S. Avenido, Jr., Philippines, 172 pages.

This study attempts to answer the following questions on the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah in 1979: (a) Did the armed forces do something that contributed to the causes which led the people of Iran to rise against the Shah? (b) When the demonstrations and riots were staged, did the armed forces manage the situation properly, or did they do something instead that worsened the situation? (c) When the period of final confrontation came, why did the armed forces fall to pieces after a mere three days of minor street fighting? (d) Relatedly, what lessons may be learned from what happened in Iran?

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FOREWORD

The subject of this study has been selected not only to satisfy intellectual curiosity but also to learn some lessons from it. There is no intention to malign anybody nor "add insult to injury." The data are presented and analyzed as fairly as possible.

I have been very fortunate to have been given support and assistance by several generous persons in this modest attempt to do a scholarly work. At the risk of missing some of their names, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks and gratitude to the following persons:

1. General Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Brigadier General Santiago B. Barangay, Commander of the Presidential Security Command, for giving me the opportunity to study at USACGSC and thus undertake this research;
2. Lieutenant Colonel David E. Russell, Major Arthur Thomas Frame, Dr. Robert M. Epstein, Dr. Philip J. Brookes, and Major Gilbert A. Bernabe, for their invaluable suggestions and encouragements in the preparation of the thesis proposal, in the conduct of the research, and in the writing of the thesis;
3. Major Dean T. Smith, for allowing himself to be interviewed about his personal experience and observations in Iran;
4. The staff of the Combined Arms Research Library, for invaluable assistance in locating or producing books and other research materials;
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6. My sister Neinay, for typing the manuscript; and

7. My wife Agnes and our kids Jo Ann, Melo, Niño and Cathy, for allowing me to spend so much time for this project which I should have spent with them.

I hope the quality of this study will give justice to their contributions.

Anselmo S. Avenido, Jr.
ANSELMO S. AVENIDO, JR.
Colonel, Philippines
USACGSC, 1984

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1) of Iran died in Egypt on 27 July 1980 after a long bout with cancer. However, his death has not diminished the keen interest of people all over the world in getting the real story behind his downfall. It has even been suggested that this topic will continue to get the attention of students for many years to come and that the Iranian revolution is a "historical reality with many unanswered questions that will long be studied." (2)

Since the fall of the Shah in 1979, several books, papers and articles have been written about it. Several views have been advanced to explain why the "Peacock throne" fell. Based on my survey of related literature, (3) none of these views have squarely answered pertinent questions on the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah. This study therefore attempts to answer those questions.

It may be asked why, of all topics, write about

Iran? Is the topic not badly beaten to pieces yet? Well, the purpose of this research is not to "add insult to injury," as the saying goes. The purpose is really to learn some lessons from what happened there. The case of Iran is not a unique one in the sense that there were circumstances of that case which are now found in many countries of the world. In fact, whenever a government is in trouble, some people immediately relate that government's situation to the case of Iran. (4) The lessons from what happened in Iran, particularly those pertaining to the military aspects, would then be useful to those countries and also to students of military art and science.

Statement of the Problem

As earlier stated, the research looks into the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah in 1979. Specifically, it attempts to answer the following questions:

1. Did the Iranian armed forces do something that contributed to the causes which led the people of Iran to rise against the Shah?
2. When the demonstrations and riots were staged, did the armed forces manage the situation properly, or did they do something instead that worsened the situation?
3. When the period of final confrontation came, why did the armed forces fall to pieces after a mere three

Iranian history. In this book, he describes the Shah's political system, the various opposition forces and the U.S.-Iranian historical involvement, and traces the interplay of economic and political factors that brought instability to Iran. He concludes that the situation in Iran developed because of inefficiencies and defects in a monarchy committed to rapid and unrestrained modernization.

1.14. Sullivan, William H., Mission to Iran (1981).- This book is a subjective narrative of the author's service as U.S. ambassador to Iran from June 1977 to April 1979. It illustrates the forces at work in Iran and the reactions of the United States to those forces. It recounts those episodes in which he personally participated which had some bearing on the events involved in the revolution. The author laments his "inability to exert any constructive influence over Washington policy decisions" and he still does not understand all the reasons that underlay U.S. policy failure at the time.

1.15. Vought, Donald, "Iran," in Richard A. Gabriel, ed., Fighting Armies: Antagonists in the Middle East - A Combat Assessment (1983).- The author of this portion of the book assesses the combat ability of the present Iranian armed forces under the Khomeini regime. He traces the history of the armed forces from the time of Cyrus the Great and discusses their organization and operation under the Pahlavi dynasty. He concludes that the army's disintegration at the time of the revolution was

glorifying Khomeini's government which is even more tyrannical and repressive. The book ends with a prayer that God preserve his country and save his people.

1.11. Roosevelt, Kermit, Counter coup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (1979).- In this book, the author describes how he, as an agent of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), planned and successfully implemented Operation "Ajax," a joint U.S.-British clandestine operation designed to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh (or Mussadeq) in 1953 allegedly before he could expel the Shah with the support of the Soviet Union.

1.12. Saikal, Amin, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (1980).- The author examines the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi from 1953 to 1979. He explains and analyzes the historical trends and developments leading to the Shah's rise to power, his dependence on the U.S., his subsequent attempt to diversify his source of dependence and its consequences to Iranian politics. The author also deals with the Shah's policies to transform Iran into an effective economic and military regional power. He concludes that the Shah's goals and policies stimulated the very trends and forces that eventually caused his downfall.

1.13. Stempel, John D., Inside the Iranian Revolution (1981).- The author was the Deputy Chief of the Political Section of the American embassy in Iran from 1975 to 1979 and therefore has a unique insight into recent

selection of his speeches and declarations which are chronologically arranged and can be considered as a documentary history of the Islamic revolution.

1.9. Miklos, Jack C., The Iranian Revolution and Modernization: Way Stations to Anarchy (1983).- This book is based on firsthand observations of the author, having served as Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. embassy in Iran, as well as on theory. Its purpose is to examine the Iranian revolution in the light of prominent theories pertaining to the effects of modernization, particularly focusing on the issues of the Iranian national character and of land reform which the author calls the "heart of the revolution." The author concludes that it is doubtful that the process of change can be controlled, manipulated and forced to conform to predetermined lines and objectives, and policymakers should therefore take this into consideration.

1.10. Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Answer to History (1980).- This book is the Shah's personal account of the circumstances surrounding his years in power and his exile after the revolution. He blamed the West, particularly America and Great Britain, for what had happened to him and Iran, and he stated that he had "never understood British and American inability to recognize Iran as a truly independent nation." He also found it difficult to understand the "Western media's double standard" for calling his government as tyrannical and repressive while

Interpretive History of Modern Iran (1981).- This book explains that the Iranian revolution was religious, political, social and economic put together and that several long-term factors in Iranian history, like geographical characteristics and religions, have contributed to political and social development down to the present. The author concludes that the recent developments in Iran have been manifestations of the "Iranians' widespread desire to demonstrate their release from foreign control and foreign ways and to build up an economy, society and culture that are independent or freely interdependent, rather than subordinate to Western powers."

1.7. Kedourie, Elie and Haim, Sylvia G., eds., Towards a Modern Iran: Studies in Thought, Politics and Society (1980).- This book brings together a group of historical studies which examine aspects of the social, intellectual and political crisis which led to the Iranian revolution. These studies indicate that the underlying causes of the upheaval are deeply rooted in Iranian history of the last century.

1.8. Khomeini, Ruhullah, translated and annotated by Algar, Hamid, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1981).- This book is a compilation of the ideas and pronouncements of Ayatollah Khomeini, in the form of writings, speeches and interviews, from 1970 to 1980. It contains the best-known work of Khomeini (his lectures on "Islamic Government") and a

religion and religious education in the Iranian culture. He concludes that the social aspirations and political ideals of the movement which felled the Shah are deeply embedded in cultural and religious logic which the West has failed to understand.

1.4. *Forbis, William H., Fall of the Peacock Throne* (1980).- This book puts the fall of the Shah and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini into some perspective by analyzing the history, politics, geography, religion, culture, and people of Iran. The author concludes that monarchy is an anachronism that is eventually doomed everywhere; that the application of money to a problem, such as the Shah's industrialization program, does not automatically solve it; and that the Shah fell because of the Hidden Imam, a doctrine in Shi'ite Islam.

1.5. *Heikal, Mohamed, Iran: The Untold Story* (1982).- This book is subtitled "An Insider's Account of America's Iranian Adventure and Its Consequences for the Future." It is an inside story of the last thirty years in Iran, of what happened in the last days of the Shah's reign, and how Khomeini's forces knew about American intentions and plans. A Muslim, the author has talked with all the key actors of this Iranian drama. He concludes that the revolution was "simply the latest chapter in a long historical process which had its origins in the national and religious inheritance of the Iranian people."

1.6. *Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution: An*

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and Ali Shariati. Obviously, this is anti-Shah. It talks about "the rising of an unarmed and oppressed people; the characteristic of the dictatorship and its brutality; the nature and interest of the military power (U.S.) of which the dictatorship was a client; and finally, the values and conflicts out of which a new social order is being created." In his foreword, Bishop C. Dale White has observed that this book "helps to set the record straight" about the Iranian revolution.

1.2. Fatemi, Faramarz S., The U.S.S.R. in Iran (1980).- This book is intended to give a background history of Russian and Anglo-American conflict in Iran, its effects on Iranian nationalism, and the fall of the Shah. However, the book is clearly biased against the Shah. Its accounts of several events do not match the versions of other writers. The author, by the way, is the son of Nasrollah Fatemi who, as a member of the Majlis (Parliament), was an avid supporter of Mohammed Mussadeq, the Iranian Prime Minister who was overthrown in a CIA-led coup d'etat in 1953; he is also the nephew of Hussein Fatemi who was Mussadeq's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1.3. Fisher, Michael M. J., Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (1980).- This book attempts to decode Shi'ite culture and belief in a way that reveals its political implications. An anthropologist, the author has spent considerable time in Iran that allows him to picture Iranian society from the inside, particularly the role of

inclinations of the writers, is it any wonder then if they come out with a wide variety of conclusions to the effect that one, some or all of the following factors or causes were responsible for the fall of the Shah: religious, cultural, organizational, political, military, historical, social, sociological, economic, intellectual, ideological, and/or psychological factors; causes having to do with nationalism, geographic characteristics, education, land reform, modernization, monarchy, dictatorship, and/or desire to be free from foreign control or influence; and/or the Shah himself? Surprisingly, as far as I know, no writer has yet attempted to directly address the questions that this study attempts to answer.

This chapter therefore gives a summary of the views presented in selected materials. The selection has been made based on balance of different views, availability of materials at the time this summary is written, and relevance to the topic at hand. The materials summarized below come in the form of books, dissertations, theses, papers and periodicals.

1. Books

1.1. Albert, David H., ed., Tell the American People: Perspectives on the Iranian Revolution (1980).- This is a compilation of articles about Iran which includes as authors such well-known persons as Ayatollah Khomeini,

CHAPTER II

RESUME OF RELATED RESEARCH AND LITERATURE

As earlier stated in Chapter I, several books, papers and articles have been written about the fall of the Shah. As one proceeds to read these materials, he soon realizes the opaqueness of the Iranian revolution. For what he discovers is a variety of views taken by a variety of writers. Some writers are pro-Shah, others are pro-Khomeini, and a few profess to be unbiased and objective. Some use models or theories to explain their ideas, others do not. Some give simple narrative accounts, others attempt to provide some analysis. Some go back to the beginning of the century, others only to the 1940's, and a few even to the beginning of civilization. Some consider all aspects of the revolution that they can think of, others pick out one or two aspects only. Some make compilations of selected articles, others write integrated works. Some of them were themselves main actors during the revolution and related events, others were mere observers and researchers. Some are academicians, others are practitioners. Given these varied backgrounds and

Chapter I End Notes

1. Also spelled Mohammed Riza Pahlevi.
2. Editorials on File (New York), Volume 11, July 1980, p. 864; Elie Kedouri and Sylvia G. Haim, eds., Towards a Modern Iran: Studies in Thought, Politics and Society (1980), p. ix; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 24 October 1980, p. 30537; and Mahmood Poursanaie, "Conditions for Revolution: The Case of Iran, 1978-1979" (Doctoral Dissertation, 1981), p. 250.
3. Please see Chapter II.
4. Editorial, "The Shah's Ghost," Wall Street Journal (New York), 5 October 1983.
5. RB 908-1, USACGSC, p. 1-1.
6. Frederick H. Hartman, The Relations of Nations (1973), Chapter 3.
7. Please see Chapters III and IV for more details.
8. Also spelled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni.
9. RB 908-1, USACGSC, p. 2-2.
10. Appropriate citations are made as the data are presented in the thesis.
11. According to the publisher of his book Iran: The Untold Story (1982).
12. All of these materials are listed in the bibliography.

revolution up to its successful termination. Chapter VII summarizes the findings of the research and gives the conclusions and lessons learned.

General Accounting Office;

6. Reports of private organizations, like those of Amnesty International and the Iranian Students Association in the United States; and

7. Several books, papers and articles written about Iran, (12) a selected number of which are reviewed in the next chapter.

This paper is broken down into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the thesis by giving the background of the study, statement of the problem, significance of the study, scope and delimitation of the study, definition of terms, and research methodology. Chapter II summarizes some of the views expressed in books, papers and articles about the Iranian revolution. Chapter III gives an overview of Iran, the Shah, the Shah's opponents, and Shi'a Islam, while Chapter IV provides an overview of the organization and operation of the Iranian armed forces. Chapter III and Chapter IV could be combined into one chapter, but that portion on the armed forces is separated in order to shorten Chapter III and also to emphasize the armed forces. Such overviews are deemed necessary to put into proper perspective the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah and to better understand that role. Chapter V focuses on the first question pertaining to the contributions of the armed forces to the causes of the revolution. Chapter VI examines the actions and reactions of the armed forces from the start of the

Research Methodology

This study uses the historical method wherein "events of the past are arranged in a logical and coherent manner to reveal hitherto unrealized relationships." (9) The principal sources of data are the following: (10)

1. Interviews, writings, and declarations of the Shah;

2. Interviews, writings, and declarations of Ayatollah Khomeyni;

3. Personal accounts of persons who served in Iran, like those of William H. Sullivan who was the last American Ambassador to Iran during the revolution, Jack C. Miklos who served as U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Iran, John D. Stempel who was the Deputy Chief of the Political Section of the American embassy in Iran from 1975 to 1979, writer Mohamed Heikal who is considered "one of the best-informed men in the Middle East" and "known and trusted by those on all sides," (11) and Kermit Roosevelt who was the officer of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency responsible for the Shah's return to power in 1953;

4. Iranian government documents, like the "Fundamental Laws of 1906" and other pertinent laws; and publications, like those of the Ministries of Culture and of Information;

5. U.S. government documents and publications, like those of the Congress, Department of State, and

evaluates the total power of a nation, he must take each of the elements into account and not only one element, (6) all of the factors that caused the fall of the Shah have to be considered. Even if this study deals particularly with the role of the armed forces, the reader must bear in mind that there were other factors and this particular factor must be considered in relation to those other factors.

This paper does not take into account what has happened to Iran after the revolution. For example, the violations of human rights now may be worse than during the Shah's regime, but this matter is of no moment as far as this paper is concerned.

Definition of Terms [7]

1. Iran.- refers to that country in the Middle East which was known for centuries as Persia; it is now ruled by Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini (8) who took over control from the Shah in 1979.

2. Shah.- refers to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, unless stated otherwise in some parts of the thesis.

3. Armed forces.- includes the military establishment, the national intelligence and security organization better known as the SAVAK, and the police forces.

days of minor street fighting?

4. Relatedly, what lessons may be learned from what happened in Iran?

Significance of the Study

What is the relevance of this study to the discipline of military art and science? Military art and science is defined as "the study of the development, operation, and support of military forces in peace and war and of their interrelationships with economic, geographic, political, and psychosocial elements of national power to achieve national objectives." (5) Given this definition, and considering that the answers to the aforementioned questions may be useful not only to the academicians for the satisfaction of their intellectual curiosity but more so to the practitioners who may find some benefit from the lessons learned, it is believed that this research is relevant to the discipline of military art and science.

Scope and Delimitation of the Study

This study pays particular attention to the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah. However, this does not mean that if ever the armed forces did indeed have such role, that factor alone could have caused the fall of the Shah. In the same manner that when one

"the culmination of the dysfunctions and weaknesses" in the system and that "the Iranian soldier, as distinct from the army as an institution, is capable of enduring privation and of executing courageous acts when well led."

2. Dissertations, Theses, and Papers

2.1. Chapple, LeRoy Windsor, "The Soviet Union and Iran: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, California, 1981).- This thesis examines the nature and scope of Soviet relations with Iran, with particular emphasis on the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the ongoing Iranian-Iraqi War, and the strategic implications of Soviet policy in Iran for the U.S. Navy and U.S. national security. The author concludes that a superpower confrontation in Iran is distinctly possible due to the volatile nature of Iran and the problems that beset the states of Southwest Asia.

2.2. Hickman, William F., "Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982" (Staff Paper, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1982).- This paper analyzes the statements and actions of the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran and outlines the changes imposed upon the military. While it assesses the effectiveness of the present post-revolution military organization, it also gives a short history of the Imperial Iranian Military. The author maintains that "the Islamic government showed a

continuity of purpose not generally ascribed to it; that the intent was not to dissolve the military, but rather to recast it in an Islamic mold; that the effort has been successful; and that the Iranian military has been reborn as an effective, as well as Islamic, fighting force."

2.3. Hosseini-Fouladi, Fereydon, "A Study of Educational Policy Formulation in Iran, 1962-1977: Establishment of Education Corps and Educational Revolution Decree" (Doctoral Dissertation, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1979).- This study focuses on the aspects of policy-making process related to the Education Corps and the Educational Revolution Decree which were key points of the Shah's "White Revolution." The findings indicate that the legislative actions were taken by decrees or orders, rather than by legislative process.

2.4. Irani, Robert G., "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Potential Implications for Major Countries in the Area" (Strategic Issues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1980).- This paper focuses on the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, its roots, its major domestic and external actors, the factors that led to the upheavals in 1978, the options to consolidate the Iranian revolution, and some of the potential implications of the revolution for major countries in the area. The author observes that the Iranian revolution reflected Iranian nationalism and the prolonged historic struggle between the two Pahlavi Shahs

and Iran's religious population and its growing middle class, and that the political roots of the Iranian revolution can be traced to the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. He concludes that "the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, along with the bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, mark the dawn of a new era in the Middle East - an era in which legitimacy, public consensus, and popular support, rather than military might and external ties, will be the principal criteria for the capability of Middle Eastern leaders to remain in power."

2.5. *Masch, Donald George, "The Iranian Revolution and Its Impact on the Future of Soviet-Iranian Relations: An Assessment"* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, California, 1980).- This study traces the history of Soviet-Iranian relations, discusses the domestic and environmental variables and the "American connection" in the Iranian revolution, and shows the impact of the Iranian revolution on Soviet-Iranian relations with the conclusion that the critical factor in such relations is Iran itself.

2.6. *Merdinger, Susan E., "A Race for Martyrdom: The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)"* (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, California, 1982).- This thesis is an attempt to show that the IRGC, which now coexists with the remnants of the Shah's Army, is not a haphazard army but one that is striving to organize while at the same time dealing with Iran's internal security as well as external threats. The author concludes that the

IRGC may eventually provide future leadership for Iran.

2.7. Mohammadi, Seyed Buik, "Social Change in Iran: The Roots of 1978-79 Revolution" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kentucky, 1982).- The purpose of this paper is to provide a sociological explanation for the Iranian revolution of 1978-79. It uses three concepts in making the analysis, namely modernization theory, dependency theory and millenarian movement. According to modernization theory, societal change conforms to an evolutionary pattern from traditional to modern. Dependency theory is a Marxist approach which holds that the social structures of contemporary Third World countries are the outcome of the dependent political and economic position these countries occupy in relation to the developed capitalist West. A millenarian movement is a religious-oriented movement that envisions the possibility of a future in which present troubles are overcome. The author concludes that both modernization and dependency theories provide a structural explanation of pre-revolutionary Iranian society but neither is sufficient to account for the fact that a revolution actually happened, and he also concludes that "the actual revolutionary process in Iran fits the pattern of an ideal-type millenarian movement."

2.8. Poursanai, Mahmood, "Conditions for Revolution: The Case of Iran, 1978-1979" (Doctoral Dissertation, West Virginia University, 1981).- This is a

case study of the Iranian revolution. Its objective is to examine the conditions which contributed to the development of the revolutionary atmosphere in the Iranian society and the success of the opposition to topple the established regime. The findings of the study indicate that the chaotic economic situations during the final years of the Shah's regime contributed to the development of popular discontent in the society; that these years were characterized by a growing political alienation and an increase in restlessness among the people; that the Islamic ideology, leadership and institutions provide the only viable alternative for the opposition; and that as the revolution progressed, both the Iranian political elite and the armed forces disintegrated, were in a state of disarray and vacillation, and were torn by conflict.

2.9. Radwan, Ann B., "Iraq-Iran and the Gulf: The Regional Dynamic" (Strategic Issues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1982).- This paper discusses the elements that interact to create the dynamic of the subregion, namely interstate relations, transnational interactions, and subregional interactions. The author observes that the stability and strength of the Shah's Iran led to a Pax Iranian in the Gulf area, but she concludes that with the coming of the Islamic revolution, "not only has the preeminent power of Iran disappeared but new factors have been added to the subregional equation."

2.10. Saunders, Harold H., "The Middle East 1978-79: Forces of Change" (Current Policy No. 77, U.S. Department of State, July 1979).- This paper records the statement of the author before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. On Iran, he stated that the "Iranian revolution took place in a particular political context, and it should not be seen as a harbinger for the Muslim world as a whole." He further stated that the collective anger of the Iranians to the Shah was a "sign of underlying, pervasive, psychological disorientation, and it expressed itself in agitation ... The abiding values of Islam were at hand ... thus the 'Islamic revival' ... It was on such a base that the revolution in Iran was justified."

2.11. Schweitzer, William C., "Foreign Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (Student Essay, U.S. Army War College, 1982).- This paper describes several aspects of the Iranian society to include a brief account of the history of the reign of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi since 1941, an account of the Islamic Revolution, a survey of Iran's political system, a description of the economic system, and a brief account of Iran's foreign policy. (1) It ends with a conclusion that the prospects for Iran's future do not look bright.

2.12. Smith, John M., "Where Was the Shah's Army?"

(Master's Thesis, USACGSC, 1980).- This study attempts to determine why the Shah of Iran was successfully overthrown by a religion, Shi'ite Islam. It is focused on the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. The author concludes that the Shah was responsible for the failure of the armed forces to maintain martial law and quell the revolution.

2.13. Yates, Carl W., "Iran - Regional Country Study" (Student Essay, U.S. Army War College, 1982).- This paper provides a background of events in Iran from 1921 to 1978 including a description of education, religion, society, politics and economics. (2) It describes the revolution of 1978 and the post-revolutionary trends. The author concludes that even if the pertinent internal and external conditions are bleak, Iran cannot be written off as a lost cause.

3. Periodicals

3.1. Berry, John A.; Mumford, Jay C.; and Smith, Roy E., "Fall of the Shah," Military Review (USACGSC, Kansas), Volume LIX, November 1979, pp. 34-41.- The authors examine the demise of the Iranian monarchy through the perspectives of the religious elites, peasants, students, merchants and the middle class. One of their conclusions is that the Shah could not stay in power by depending solely on military support and use of the state's coercive organs because of the absence of a modernized

political structure.

3.2. Bill, James A., "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran," The Middle East Journal (Washington, D.C.), Volume 36, 1982, pp. 22-47.- The author traces the relationship between religion and power in Iran and contends that although the revolution against the Shah was a multi-class phenomenon in which the people of Iran rose against a hated system, it was the Shi'a religious establishment that in fact directed and then took control of the revolution.

3.3. Chernousov, Mikhail; "Iran Retrospect," New Times: A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs (Moscow), January 1980.- This is a Russian account of "how the web of imperialist conspiracy against Iran was woven, how the CIA helped to overthrow the lawful Mossadegh government which wanted to deliver Iran from alien overlordship, and how the Shah's pro-American dictatorship was established." The author concludes that the Iranian events of the early 1950's shed light on later developments.

3.4. Fatemi, Khosrow, "Leadership by Distrust: The Shah's Modus Operandi," The Middle East Journal (Washington, D.C.), Volume 36, 1982, pp. 48-61.- This article analyzes the Shah's leadership and his modus operandi from an organizational and operational perspective. The author concludes that the failure of the Shah's organizational hierarchy to respond to the first serious challenge to his regime in two decades contributed,

more than any other factors, not only to the demise of the Shah but also to the apparent discontinuance of centuries of Persian monarchy, and that the sudden disintegration of his system provided the critical element that enabled the Iranian revolution to succeed.

3.5. Ramazani, R. K., "Who Lost America? The Case of Iran." *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, D.C.), Volume 36, 1982, pp. 5-21 - The author discusses the interplay between domestic and foreign policies of the Shah, and contends that the Shah's domestic politics formed the *raison d'etre* of his American policy from start to finish and that the Shah wooed, won and eventually lost American support largely because of the way he played the game of domestic politics.

Summary

This chapter summarizes some of the views expressed in books, papers and articles about the Iranian revolution. One notes that the literature on the matter covers several aspects of the revolution and the views expressed on the fall of the Shah widely vary depending on the disciplines and biases of the authors. However, as far as I know, no writer has yet attempted to directly address the questions that this present study attempts to answer.

Chapter 11 End Notes

1. It should be noted that Chapter 2 of William Schweitzer's paper ("Foreign Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran") is exactly the same, word for word, as Chapter II of Carl Yates' paper ("Iran - Regional Country Study").
2. Same comment as Note 1 above.

CHAPTER III

AN OVERVIEW OF IRAN, THE SHAH, THE SHAH'S OPPONENTS, AND SHI'A ISLAM

In order to put into proper perspective the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah, it is necessary that one must have an overview of Iran, its history and geography, the Shah, the Shah's opponents, Shi'a Islam, and the armed forces. It is therefore the purpose of Chapters III and IV to give such an overview.

Iran

Iran is that country in the Middle East which was known for centuries as Persia. In 1935, its government requested all foreign countries to use the official name Iran. The name Persia originally referred to a region in southern Iran formerly known as Persis (now Fars), but the ancient Greeks and other Western people later applied the name to the entire country. The name Iran means "land of the Aryans," a group of closely related tribes who started occupying Iran as early as the 9th century B.C. (1)

A large country with a total area of 628,000 square

miles, Iran is five times the size of Italy, and equal to the combined areas of England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark. In 1979, its population was around 35 million. Iran can be roughly divided into three areas: one third consists of mountains, one third deserts, and one third forests and wooded lands. Many of Iran's sedimentary basins contain large oil deposits and its mountains have many useful minerals and metals. Its land area is situated on the so-called Iranian Plateau which is a triangle set between two depressions - the Caspian Sea to the north and the Persian Gulf to the south - and bounded by mountains rising around a central depression which is a desert region. Iran is bounded on the north by the Soviet Union and the Caspian Sea, on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, on the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan, and on the west by Turkey and Iraq. The capital of Iran is Tehran. (2) (Please see map of Iran next page.)

Iran is strategically located. It is the land bridge between Europe and the East, controlling important airlanes and overland connections. It bars the northern approaches to the Middle East and hinders Russia's desire for the warm water ports in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. And it dominates the waters of the Persian Gulf through which passes almost 60 percent of the world's oil trade. (3) To illustrate further the strategic value of Iran, it may be pointed out that a few months before the Shah fell, then U.S. President Carter "made clear that he

FIGURE 1
MAP OF IRAN



SOURCE: Ali-Reza Nobari, ed., Iran Briefs (1971),
p. 237.

regarded Iran as strategically important to the United States and our allies ... and stressed the importance he placed on the continuing role of Iran as a force for stability and security in the Persian Gulf region." (4)

As mentioned earlier, there is oil in Iran. In 1977, Iran was the world's fourth largest oil producer, with a daily output of around six million barrels, and the second largest exporter. (5) This fact alone would have made any ruler in Iran happy. Ironically, it was not so for the Shah, as he later observed after his fall:

The development of the oil industry constitutes the most tumultuous aspect of modern Mideast history. It is an unending series of intrigues, plots, political and economic upsets, acts of terrorism, coups d'etat and bloody revolutions. To understand the upheaval in Iran and other parts of the Middle East, one must understand the politics of oil. (6)

Iran is a very old country and its history goes back into the "mists of time." (7) Its history has been described as "extraordinary":

It is not a history easily summarized. Great kings, great armies, great conquests over vast territories, and advanced administration are a part of it. Religious movements of deep and abiding influence on the world's major religions are another part of it. The arts, notably literature and music, and above all, poetry, are another part of it. Nor are the sciences lacking ... [There] were literally thousands of astronomers, mathematicians, jurists, architects, poets, renaissance men of a type anticipating by some centuries the European renaissance men. (8)

Although the recorded history of Iran starts some 2,500 years ago with the rise of the Achaemenian (or Achaemenid) empire under the leadership of Cyrus the Great

(40) As stated in 1978 by Abol-Hassan Banisadr, who became the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

The opposition of the people is not organized, possessing neither a liberating army nor a powerful party. The only thing it possesses is great esteem for the religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the general belief in his rectitude and sincerity. (41)

Both his grandfather and father were religious scholars. His father, Ayatullah Mustafa, died only five months after his birth, (42) so his mother and an aunt were responsible for his early upbringing. At the age of sixteen, he lost both mother and aunt, so it was his elder brother Sayyid Murtaza, later known as Ayatullah Pasandida, who supervised his education.

At the age of nineteen, he was sent to study the religious sciences in the town of Arak under the guidance of Shayky Abd al-Karim Ha'iri who was concerned with political activism as well as learning. The following year, he went with Ha'iri to Qum to settle there, thus helping to elevate it to the status of spiritual capital of Islamic Iran. At the age of twenty-seven, he wrote a treatise on ethics and spiritual philosophy. He therefore first gained fame as a writer and teacher concerned with devotional and mystical matters. As a teacher in the 1930's, he constantly exhorted his listeners to devote themselves to solving the problems of the day as part of their religious duty.

His early years in Qum coincided with the

and it happened because of the active participation of some influential persons and groups. (36) Of course, these persons and groups belonged to different organizations and factions. As described by Khomeini:

Some of them are definitely pro-Islamic and genuinely serving the cause. Others include both people sympathetic to Islam and others not sympathetic. And finally, there are groups that are hostile to Islam and those are a minority. (37)

Who were these opponents of the Shah? This portion of the paper describes them under the following categories: Khomeini and the clergy; the Tudeh or communist party; the liberals (National Coalition Front and Freedom Movement); the radicals (Mujahadeen and Fedayeen); and others (bazaaris, students and non-Iranian supporters).

1. Ayatollah Khomeini (38)

"For heaven's sake, who is this Khomeini?" (39)

His full name is Ruhollah al-Musawi ibn Mustafa ibn Ahmad al-Musawi al-Khomeyni. Khomeyni or Khomeini is not a family name but an attribution to the Iranian town of Khomein or Khumayn, located some hundred kilometers to the southwest of Tehran, where he was born on 24 September 1902. He was the Shah's arch-enemy, the symbol and rallying point of the revolution, and the most influential of the prominent ayatollahs in Iran. Without him, the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 would not have taken place.

withdrawal from the areas it was occupying in Northern Iran ... In 1949 President Truman again took the initiative to include Iran in our Point 4 program. In 1950 we concluded a security assistance agreement. From that time through the late 1960's, economic and military assistance were major elements in our joint efforts to strengthen and develop Iran. For two full decades, Congress supported economic assistance to Iran totaling \$2 billion and our military aid program reached a figure of \$1.4 billion. (34)

In 1959, the United States concluded a bilateral agreement with Iran in which the U.S. considered Iran's independence vital to its own interest, and committed to furnish military assistance to Iran and also to come to Iran's aid if attacked. In December 1977, U.S. President Carter declared that "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world." Yet the Shah later complained that he "never understood British and American inability to recognize Iran as a truly independent nation." (35)

The Shah's Opponents

It is an acknowledged fact that the Iranian revolution was broad-based. Most of the people supported the revolution, particularly during the later stages. It can even be said that almost everybody fought the Shah. Apparently, the goal that united most of the nation was to get rid of the Shah. But the national uprising did not come overnight. It came about over a long period of time,

Without it Mohammad Reza Pahlavi would not have been overthrown. (31)

Another significant point pertained to the armed forces. As emphasized by a former U.S. embassy official:

In many respects the 1963 uprising was the foreshadow of the fateful riots of 1978 which led to the overthrow of the Shah. A key difference, however, was that the army then held fast and the government took swift and severe action. (32)

The final challenge to the Shah came in 1978 and 1979 when almost the whole nation turned against him. He was forced to leave Iran. He had hoped that his departure would save his throne; instead, his departure hastened its fall. He spent his last days in Morocco, Bahamas, Mexico, U.S.A. (for medical treatment only), Panama, and finally Egypt where he died in 1980. In his memoirs which he wrote while in exile, he summarized his accomplishments:

We strengthened Iran's independence and unity in 1945-46; we pulled the country out of chaos in 1953. We next put our economy and finances in order; we wrested our oil resources from foreign ownership; and from 1963 we set our people, with their overwhelming approval, upon the road of common sense and progress, toward the Great Civilization. (33)

It may be pertinent to mention that it was only during the reign of the Shah when the United States began to get actively involved in Iran. As pointed out by one official:

We have had close ties with Iran for three decades. These ties have been supported and fostered by three Democratic and three Republican Presidents, reflecting a broad, non-partisan consensus ... In 1946 President Truman considered Iran sufficiently important for us to use our full influence to secure Soviet

nationalization of water resources, social security, anti-corruption campaign, and housing. These reforms, particularly the land reform which adversely affected the religious estates and the reform of electoral law which consequently granted universal suffrage, were against tradition and the vested interests of the clergy. It was not surprising, therefore, to see the clergy leading the opposition to the "White Revolution." The Shah's arch-enemy, Ayatollah Khomeini, immediately denounced the "White Revolution" as a "fraudulent revolution" and it had been a major issue against the Shah since then. (29)

The first violent reaction to the "White Revolution" came in the summer of 1963 when riots, led by the clergy, broke out. But the Shah and his Prime Minister did not hesitate to use an overwhelming military force to put down the unrest. Estimates of casualties in this showdown ranged from government figures of 86 killed and 100 to 200 injured, to opposition claims of several hundreds killed and 1,500 wounded. Because of this incident, Khomeini later referred to the "White Revolution" as "the bloody and colonialist revolution." (30)

Some significant points emerged out of the 1963 anti-Shah uprising. One point pertained to the opposition. As one observer stresses:

The most important development ... was the beginning of collaboration between the two types of opposition - the secular forces and the religious groups. Fifteen years later this close cooperation had expanded and gained in strength.

political enemies. The old man had been indomitable in his will and decisive in his actions. Mohammed Reza Shah indicated a fateful sort of indecision and an absence of conviction in crisis. (27)

As a result of his experience with Mossadegh, the Shah proceeded to take active role in government and pay special attention to the military. One observer describes the situation in Iran after Mossadegh as follows:

For the next ten years, Iran was occupied with the aftermath of this crisis. When the dispute over oil was resolved with the British, and revenue from its sale once again began to flow into the country to finance the economic development programs laid out by the Plan Organization, the military was rehabilitated and modernized. Nearly all political party activity ceased. Subversive groups were broken up and hunted down, and others became inactive or quiescent as the central authority of the Shah was restored and a period of recovery got underway. (28)

In 1963, the Shah launched his reform program known as the "White Revolution," believing that "Iran needed a deep and fundamental revolution that could, at the same time, put an end to all the social inequalities and all the factors which caused injustice, tyranny and exploitation, and all aspects of reaction which impeded progress and kept our society backward." This program initially included land reform, nationalization of forests and pastures, public sale of state-owned factory, profit-sharing in industry, reform of electoral law, literacy corps, health corps, reconstruction and development corps, and houses of equity. Later, the following points were added: administrative reforms, educational reforms,

economy and the British ownership of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which controlled most of Iran's petroleum assets. The Shah was therefore forced to name as Prime Minister a 73-year old popular politician named Mossadegh who immediately moved to nationalize the oil facilities. The British retaliated by organizing a boycott of Iranian oil, thus adversely affecting Iran's ailing economy and causing further internal discontent. In 1952, the Shah attempted to replace Mossadegh but the new Prime Minister Ahmed Ghavam only succeeded in exacerbating the situation. The Shah therefore had to recall Mossadegh into service not only as Prime Minister but also as Minister of War. In a few months, Mossadegh was able to consolidate power to a point that he was suspected of plotting the ouster of the Pahlavi dynasty. So on 13 August 1953, the Shah dismissed Mossadegh and appointed General Fazlollah Zahedi as Prime Minister. However, because of the resistance put up by Mossadegh and his supporters, particularly the Tudeh, this order was finally implemented only on 19 August 1953. The overthrow of Mossadegh, actually a coup d'etat, would not have been successful without the support of the British, the Americans particularly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Iranian armed forces. (26)

The Shah's indecisiveness in times of crisis surfaced during the political events of 1953:

His confrontation with Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was not in the same mold as the confrontations that his father had had with his

keep Iran's existence. In 1942, he was able to get the British and the Russians to sign an agreement which specified the departure of the Allied forces from Iran within six months after the end of hostilities and which guaranteed against any future division of Iran between Russia and Britain. (23) In 1943, he declared war on Germany. However, despite Iran's new allied status, the British and the Russians continued to interfere in Iranian affairs, particularly in elections to the parliament. It was at about this time when the communist party, Tudeh, was formed. (24) After the war, with Russian support, the Tudeh became strong and was able to organize rebellions in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan. This development caused Russia to delay withdrawal of its troops from Iran. However, the Iranian government, assisted by the political pressures from the British and the Americans, finally convinced the Russians to leave. Not long after the departure of the Russians, the rebels were attacked by the Iranian troops under the personal supervision of the Shah who himself made reconnaissance flights over enemy-held territories. The rebels surrendered and the Shah was able to reclaim Iran's northern provinces in the later part of 1946. In 1949, after an attempt on his life, the Shah banned the Tudeh. (25)

His next major challenge came in the early 1950's in the person of Mohammed Mossadegh. At this time, popular discontent and unrest had grown over Iran's stagnating

became the second Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty. He retained the name Reza because it was given by Reza Shah to all his sons in honor of Imam Reza. (20) The title Aryamehr means "the light or sun of the Aryans." The title Shahanshah means "king of kings or a great king," and it had been the traditional title of the Shahs of Iran since the Achaemenid empire. (21) This paper refers to Mohammed Reza Pahlavi simply as the Shah.

The Shah was born on 26 October 1919. At that time, his father was still an officer of the Iranian Cossack Brigade. As noted earlier, he was only seven years old when his father was crowned as Shah in 1926. At around this age, he was entrusted to the care of a French governess from whom he owed his ability to speak and read French and his interest in Western culture. After graduation from the elementary military school in Teheran in 1931, his father sent him, together with some Iranian boys, to Switzerland to continue his studies. When he returned to Iran in 1936, at the age of 17, he was sent to the Iranian military school where he graduated as a second lieutenant in 1938. As the crown prince, he spent most of his time with his father who at that time was buying vast tracts of land, particularly along Iran's frontier "primarily for national security reasons." (22)

When he assumed the throne in 1941, he proclaimed an end to absolute rule by granting power to his cabinet and the parliament. His most urgent task then was how to

minimized the power of the religious leaders; carried out a modernization and industrialization program; reorganized and strengthened the army and the police force; implemented educational and social reforms; initiated a plan to increase agricultural production; established a national bank; and constructed the Trans-Iranian Railway, port installations and roads. However, some of Reza Shah's programs, particularly those affecting the clergy, brought him into confrontation with the religious leaders, a confrontation which burst into violence during the 1930's and which became overshadowed only by foreign developments. (17)

When World War II came, Iran declared neutrality. However, because of Reza Shah's close association with the Germans and Iran's strategic geographical position, British and Russian military forces moved into Iran when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. (18) Reza Shah was forced to abdicate and then sent into exile, eventually ending in South Africa where he died in July 1944. In his stead, the crown prince Mohammed Reza Pahlavi assumed the throne at the age of 22. (19)

The Shah

Mohammed Reza Pahlavi took his oath on 16 September 1941, assumed the official title of "His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr, Shahanshah of Iran," and

leave the country. In 1923, Reza became the Prime Minister. For a time, he hoped to turn Iran into a republic, but some members of the clergy, politicians and merchants prevailed upon him to maintain the monarchy. Accordingly, in October 1925, the parliament voted the Qajar dynasty out of power. In April 1926, as a result of the decision of a constituent assembly in December 1925, (15) Reza Khan was crowned the Shah of Iran, the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty. His eldest son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, became the crown prince at the age of seven. Reza Shah selected the name Pahlavi because it was the name of the official language and writings of the emperors during the Sassanid era. (16)

Official Pahlavi accounts claim that modern, contemporary Iran began with the Pahlavi dynasty. Whatever this means, and even if this claim is self-serving, Reza Shah did many things during his reign. He started as a constitutional monarch, claiming to implement the Constitution of 1906, but he turned out to be an absolute monarch. Although this constitution gave the Shah a role in decision-making and execution of governmental policy, Reza Shah actually became the most important national symbol and political force in Iran, utilizing the army under his command to support his moves. He proceeded to reunite the provinces and subjugate the Southern tribes. He also appointed all governors of provinces and mayors of cities, convinced the parliament to outlaw communism,

Muhammed Ali, and the ensuing competition for the selection of a regent caused various groups to fight for control. Added to this were the critical financial problems of Iran which the Qajar monarchs created and the peace and order problems attendant to World War I. By the end of the war, Iran was in a state of near-anarchy. It was in this situation when Reza Shah Pahlavi, also known as Reza Khan, came into power. (13)

Reza Shah was born in Mazandaran in the northern region of Iran in 1878. He rose through the ranks of the Persian Cossack Brigade which at the time was serving as the constabulary force in the northern region. By the time the communist revolution took place in Russia, he was the senior Persian serving under the Russian officer cadre. When the Russian officers left in 1920, Reza Khan took over the command of the Cossack Brigade which was composed of 2,500 men. At this time, the situation in Iran had become chaotic. So, in 1921, upon suggestion of the commander of British forces in Persia, General Ironside, (14) and with the help of a young political journalist named Seyed Zia ed-Din Tabataba'i, Reza Khan left his headquarters with 1,200 horsemen, moved to Tehran, and surrounded the capital. On 21 February 1921, Reza Khan forced the ruler Ahmad Shah to appoint a new government. Zia ed-Din became Prime Minister, while Colonel Reza Khan became Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Minister of War. After three months, Zia ed-Din was forced to resign his post and

and Russians, and ruled by various dynasties, but they have somehow managed to maintain their national identity. (10)

It was in 633 A.D., with the Arab invasion, when Islam was introduced into the country to replace the indigenous Zoroastrian religion. However, instead of adopting the Arabic Sunni doctrine, the Persians developed the Shi'ite doctrine. Shi'ism was the rallying point which Shah Ismail used in establishing the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722) after the reign of terror of the Mongols. Shi'ism then became the official religion of the state. (11)

During the Qajar dynasty (1794-1925), which established capital at Tehran, the constitutional movement in Iran developed. This movement obligated the weak Mozzaffar-ed-Din Shah to grant, in 1906, a few days before his death, what Mohammed Reza Pahlavi later called a "paper constitution." (12) Members of the religious classes played a leading part in the movement and were strongly represented in the first Majlis (Parliament) which opened in 1906. It was also during this period when Iran was drawn more deeply into the power-politics of Europe. In 1907, the infamous Anglo-Russian Agreement was drawn up, recognizing Iran's independence and integrity on one hand but dividing Iran into two zones of influence on the other hand. Mozzaffar-ed-Din Shah's successor Muhammed Ali Shah came to the throne in January 1907, but a national uprising forced him to abdicate and flee to Russia in July 1909. Ahmad Shah was only twelve years of age when he succeeded

and Darius, archaeological evidence suggests that the Iranian Plateau had been the site of some of the world's oldest settlements. Of the ancient civilizations there, the Elamites were among the foremost and they created their capital at Susa. (19)

After the Elamites, the plateau was the scene of many invasions, and one of the strongest tribes to invade were the Aryans. A branch of these Aryans, the Medes, settled on the western portion of the plateau, making their capital at ancient Ecbatana, now called Hamadan. Another branch of the Aryans, the Pars, settled in the southeast portion of the plateau, with their capital at Pasargadae. In 550 B.C., a king known as Cyrus the Great arose among the Pars. He defeated the Medes and united the two peoples, thus laying the basis for the Achaemenian or Persian empire. Cyrus and his successors expanded, by conquests, the empire which at a time stretched from what is now the southern part of the Soviet Union all the way down to Egypt; established capital at Persepolis; and introduced concepts of jurisprudence, fiscal responsibility and general centralized administration. The influence of the Achaemenians survived up to the 20th century in the forms of the present Persian or Iranian language and of the tradition of monarchy and strong central leadership which had continued unbroken up to the Pahlavi rule. Over the years, the Persians have been conquered by the Greeks, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, Mongols, Portuguese, Afghans, British,

establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty by Reza Khan. Khomeini perceived Reza Khan's dictatorship as having for its chief aim the elimination of Islam as a political, social and cultural force. However, his first public statement of a political nature came in a book published in 1941, Kashf al-Asrar, which contains numerous passages overtly political and critical of the Pahlavi rule.

In 1937, Ha'iri died. Ayatullah Burujirdi succeeded to the role of Ha'iri with the support of Khomeini who expected Burujirdi to oppose the Pahlavi rule. However, until his death in 1962, Burujirdi was almost totally inactive in political matters. Nevertheless, it was Burujirdi who urged Khomeini to write Kashf al-Asrar.

After the death of Burujirdi, no single successor to his position emerged. But the prominence of Khomeini surfaced because of his willingness to confront the regime of the Shah (this time, it was Muhammad Reza, the son of Reza Khan) at a time when few dared to do so. To Khomeini, the repressive measures directed against the religious institution by Muhammad Reza were a direct continuation of the actions of the father Reza Shah. So he led the campaign against the opening of liquor stores and against a law abolishing the requirement that candidates for election to local assemblies be Muslim and male.

In 1963, when the Shah promulgated his "White Revolution," Khomeini denounced it as a "fraudulent revolution" through a series of sermons from Fayziya

Madrasa in Qum. The Shah's regime responded by sending soldiers. A number of persons were killed. But Khomeini, far from being intimidated, continued to denounce the Shah's regime throughout the spring of 1963. He concentrated his attacks on the tyrannical nature of the Shah's regime, its subordination to the United States, and its expanding collaboration with Israel. On 3 June 1963, he delivered a speech in Qum which contained "fearless words of reproach addressed to the Shah." Two days later, he was arrested and imprisoned in Tehran.

The arrest of Khomeini caused people in Qum, Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, and Kashan to stage demonstrations and riots in support of Khomeini. According to the Shah, these riots were "inspired by an obscure individual who claimed to be a religious leader." In a confrontation with the army, several demonstrators were shot and killed. (43) This incident established Khomeini as a national leader and spokesman for popular aspirations, and foreshadowed the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79.

The uprising was suppressed, but the movement to press for Khomeini's release persisted. While imprisoned at Isfahan Garrison in Tehran, the SAVAK head Hasan Pakravan visited Khomeini and told him, "Politics is all dirt, lying and viciousness; why don't you leave it to us?" (44) On 6 April 1964, Khomeini was released together with a government announcement that he had agreed to refrain from engaging in political activity as a condition for his

release. This was immediately refuted by Khomeini who resumed his denunciations against the Shah's regime with undiminished vigor.

In October 1964, the Majlis or Iranian Parliament granted legal immunity to American personnel for all offenses committed in Iranian territory. On 27 October, Khomeini furiously denounced this act of parliament. As a result, he was arrested again on 4 November 1964 and sent into exile in Turkey. Because of continual pressure on the Shah's regime, Khomeini was allowed to move from Turkey to Najaf, Iraq in October 1965. Najaf became his home for thirteen years.

The Shah's regime wrongly thought that Khomeini would be overshadowed in Najaf by the religious authorities there. On the contrary, he established himself as a major presence in Najaf and maintained his influence and popularity in Iran. As described by one writer, "The influence of Ayatollah Khomeini, instead of decreasing after his exile from Iran, has on the contrary increased tenfold." From Najaf, he issued periodic proclamations concerning developments in Iran that were smuggled into the country and then clandestinely circulated. Thus the name and person of Khomeini and the cause that he embodied were never forgotten in Iran. (45)

On 23 November 1977, the elder son of Khomeini, Hajj Mustafa, died suddenly in Najaf. Khomeini's supporters in Iran blamed the SAVAK for this death. (46)

On 8 January 1978, one week after President Carter had been in Tehran lauding the Shah as a wise statesman loved by his people, the government-controlled press printed an article supplied by the Ministry of the Court attacking Khomeini as an agent of foreign powers. The public reaction was immediate outrage. The following day in Qum, demonstrations broke out. Several demonstrators were killed by the armed forces. This was only the first of a series of bloody demonstrations which occurred throughout the country. (47)

In September 1978, the Shah's regime requested the Ba'athist government of Iraq to expel Khomeini from its territory, in the hope of depriving him of his base of operations. No Muslim country offered to take him in, so he went to France, taking up residence at Neuilly-le-Chateau near Paris in early October 1978. (48)

This transfer to France proved beneficial to Khomeini and his group. Communication with Iran was easier from France than it had been from Iraq. Khomeini's declarations were sent to Iran with increasing frequency and his words now began to reach a global audience. His safety was also assured since he was by now untouchable by the SAVAK; anything that would happen to him would be attributed by the whole world to the Shah, particularly the SAVAK. In France, he had a small staff headed by Ibrahim Yazdi, who later became the Vice Premier for Revolutionary Affairs at the start of Khomeini's regime, who had moved

there from the United States. (49)

When the Shah decided to leave Iran on 16 January 1979, Khomeini, now almost 77 years old, prepared to return to Iran. When he arrived in Iran on 1 February, he was met with a tumultuous welcome. On 11 February, the Pahlavi dynasty finally came to an end and the Islamic Republic of Iran was born. Khomeini's long struggle that had been going on for sixteen uninterrupted years finally bore fruit. Since then, he has remained as the highest authority in Iran. (50)

What was Khomeini's secret of success? It's simple. According to him:

I, who consider myself a servant of the learned ulema and of the Moslem people, am ready to place myself at the disposal of the smallest individual and of the Moslems in the hours of danger to serve the major causes of the Moslems. (51)

2. The Clergy or Religious Leadership

The Shah described his enemy as "the unholy alliance of red and black," black for the turbans of the ayatollahs and red for the banners of the communists. He spoke of the religious leaders as "ragheads" and "corrupt and venal" persons who obstructed his country's progress "based on their personal greed and their desire to hold on to the remnants of their secular power." But this only underscores the importance of the role played by the clergy in the fight against the Shah. So pervasive was the

participation of the clergy that western media "claimed that the upheaval was the work of a band of 'religious extremists' opposed to the 'modernization drive' of the Shah." It was in fact the clergy or ulema who "directed and then took control of the revolution." (52) In the words of Khomeini himself:

Throughout the different stages of the Revolution, the religious leaders played the primary role. Of course, others also took part - university professors, intellectuals, merchants, students - but it was the religious leaders who mobilized the whole people all over Iran, and it was from the mosques that the people set out behind their preachers and leaders to participate in demonstrations. (53)

The clergy in Iran was poorly structured. There was no single person on top of a hierarchy. But there were the ayatollahs and the other mujtahids (representatives of the Hidden Imam) and the mullahs (preachers). There were some 350 ayatollahs in Iran and Khomeini emerged as the most important of the approximately twelve prominent ayatollahs. Of the ayatollahs left in Iran during Khomeini's exile, Ayatollah Beheshti and Ayatollah Taleghani were the most active. (54)

Why was the clergy successful? Khomeini has provided the answer:

It is because the people consider us to be the servants of Islam and of the country. It is because we explore the problems which arise in the depths of the nation; it is because we give voice to the aspirations of the people. (55)

3. The Tudeh or Communist Party

When the Tudeh was outlawed in 1949, it did not die. It continued to grow. In 1953, during the premiership of Mossadegh, it was virtually in control of the country. It was even able to establish a strong network in the military for the purpose of destroying the foundations of the monarchical system and toppling the Shah. However, its military network was discovered by the military governorship of Tehran in 1954 and about 600 officers and men were arrested. This infiltration in the military was an indication, at least to the Shah, that some segments of the military were potentially receptive to anti-regime sentiments. (56)

Despite the setbacks it suffered in the fall of Mossadegh and the discovery of its military network, the Shah insisted that the Tudeh was a strong and active enemy. However, by this time, the Tudeh had rejected the idea of the armed struggle proposed by other leftists, labelling them as adventurist-anarchists. What it wanted, up to the time of the revolution, was "anti-dictatorial unification" among those "disenchanted with the Shah's ruthless dictatorship." (57)

The Khomeini camp denied the existence of the so-called "Islam-Marxist" alliance. According to the teachings of Khomeini and Shariati, Islam and Marxism were opposed to each other. (58) As to the existence of the

Tudeh, the following comment of Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, Khomeini's aide in France, would be appropriate:

Tudeh party is not a nationalist party ... This party has always moved according to the interests of the Soviet policy and not according to the Iranian national interests ... Their total number does not exceed several hundreds. (59)

Be that as it may, the Tudeh was a force to reckon with.

4. The Liberals

As far as the Shah was concerned, the liberals were as dangerous an enemy as any other groups. They belonged to the National Coalition Front (or National Front or simply the Front) and the National Freedom Movement (or Freedom Movement or Liberation Movement). The Front was formed in the early 1950's under the leadership of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh. After the return of the Shah to power in 1953, the Front was suppressed. It was reestablished in 1963, but it was once again suppressed by the Shah. During this period, several members separated from the Front and organized themselves into the Freedom Movement. In 1977, the Front became active again. (60)

The Front was considered a "moderate, pro-Western faction," espousing "western social democracy incompatible with the leftist goal of a Marxist state." The Khomeini group did not consider it as a party at all because its influence as a political force was "very limited."

However, in the late 1977, it was the Front that issued an open letter to the Shah criticizing him for unprecedented violations of human rights, civil freedom and the constitution. (61)

The key personalities of the Front were Karim Sanjabi, the party president, and Shapur Bakhtiar. Sanjabi and Bakhtiar separated ways when Sanjabi joined the group of Khomeini in September 1978. Sanjabi later became Khomeini's Foreign Minister in 1979. On the other hand, Bakhtiar was a long-standing opponent of both the Shah and Khomeini. He had wanted a constitutional solution that would remove the Shah and Khomeini at the same time. He therefore did not go with Sanjabi to the Khomeini camp; later, he accepted the Shah's offer for him to become the Prime Minister just before the Shah left Iran in 1979. (62)

The Freedom Movement was a close supporter of the ayatollahs in Iran. It had a direct contact with the Khomeini entourage in France. The well-known personalities in the group were Mehdi Bazargan, Amir Entezam, and Nasser Minatchi. Bazargan was the president of the Association for Human Rights in Iran before and during the revolution and was the first Prime Minister under the Khomeini regime. He was cited by Khomeini for successfully coordinating the strikes of the oil workers during the revolution. (63)

5. The Radicals

The strengthening of the Shah's powers after the 1963 riots led the young members of the opposition to believe in the bankruptcy of peaceful means to fight the Shah. These radicals then got together to form guerilla groups. In the 1970's two groups managed to survive: (a) Sazemane Cherik-ha-ye Fedaei Khalg-i Iran (Organization of the Guerilla Freedom Fighters of Iranian People), known as Marxist Fedayeen ; and (b) Sanzamane Mujahedine Khalg-i Iran (Organization of the People's Combatants of Iran), known as Islamic Mujahidin (or Mujahadeen). Both had similar hatred for the Shah's regime; their major difference was that the Mujahadeen was strongly influenced by extreme religious conservatism, while the Fedayeen openly followed the Marxist-Leninist lines. On some occasions, both groups were reported to be working together in committing political murders in Iran. (64)

The Fedayeen was a small but effective group during the revolution. Although Marxist in orientation, it was not close to Moscow. Believed to be trained by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under George Habash, it was this group who attacked the American embassy on 14 February 1979. It was also this group who fought the Imperial Guard troops near the Feharabad air base in Tehran during the last days of the revolution. However, despite their role in the revolution, its members were denounced by

Khomeini as "anti-Islamic opportunists." (65)

The Mujahadeen was an urban terrorist movement composed of Shi'a faithful. Because of its religious color, it was thought to be Khomeini's Islamic army. It received training in Libya and Lebanon, particularly from the PLO under Yasir Arafat. Because it used slogans which gave socialistic interpretations to quotations from the Koran, the Shah saw in it the Islamo-Marxist connection. (66)

6. Others

In addition to the aforesited opponents of the Shah, there were other groups who were also very active in opposing the Shah. Belonging to this category were the student groups, both inside and outside Iran, and the bazaar or merchants in Iran. The students vehemently opposed the Shah after the announcement of the U.S. human rights policy. As regards the bazaar, their association with the Shi'a clergy was very close and intimate. (67)

It may be noted that Khomeini's group did not receive support from any of the Muslim governments nor the well-known Islamic organizations. However, it did receive "sympathy" from individual citizens and minor groups. (68)

Shi'a Islam

The Iranian revolution was deeply rooted in Iran's religion. (69) It is therefore important that one has a good understanding of this subject.

Islam is the world's second largest religion after Christianity. It started in Arabia in 610 A.D. when Muhammed received a message from God which was relayed to him in a vision by archangel Gabriel. This first revelation was followed by others, on and off, for twenty years. These revelations became the basis of the Koran (or Kur'an) and established Muhammed's role as the "Prophet" and "Messenger of God." (70.)

The Moslem or Islamic world is now mainly divided into two sectors - the Sunni and the Shi'ite. The Sunni, which is considered the orthodox sect, is practised by about ninety percent of all Moslems and recognized in the majority of Islamic states. The Shi'ite is the predominant sect in Iran, more than ninety percent of its population being Shi'ites. All Moslems believe in God, God's angels, God's messengers or prophets, God's books, life after death, and predestination. They all agree on the sources of Moslem law, of which the two main ones are the Koran and the Hadith or the prophet's sayings handed down from generation to generation. (71) According to Ayatollah Khomeini:

All the laws and regulations you need are present

in our Islam, whether the laws and regulations pertain to state management, taxes, penalties or to other issues. You need no new legislation. You must implement what has already been legislated. This saves you a lot of time and effort and spares you the need of borrowing laws from the east or the west. Everything is, God be thanked, ready to be used. (72)

The split within Islam goes back to the death of Muhammed in 632 A.D.. He died without any provisions for succession, so his cousin and son-in-law, Ali Ibn Abi Talib claimed to be the successor. However, a majority of Muhammed's followers appointed another person Abu Bakr as the first caliph or successor of Muhammed. There were two other caliphs before Ali finally took over the caliphate, as the fourth caliph, twenty-three years after Muhammed's death. In 661 A.D., Ali was assassinated by a dissident, so his eldest son, Hasan, succeeded him. Hasan soon abdicated in favor of the powerful Umayyad governor of Syria, Mu'awiyah. Hasan's younger brother Husayn rose in rebellion against Mu'awiyah, but he was captured, tortured and killed by the Sunni followers of Mu'awiyah in 680 A.D.. Thus Shi'ism was born. The "martyrdom" of Husayn became the major symbol of Shi'ism. (73)

Sunni Islam traces its origins to the followers of the second caliph Umar. The term "Sunni" derives from the Arabic "Sunna" or "customs and traditions." Shi'a Islam or Shi'ism comes from the supporters or partisans of Ali, the fourth caliph. The term "Shi'a" derives from the Arabic "Shi'at Ali" or "Party of Ali." The Sunnis have continued

to use the term "Caliph," but the Shi'ites, who wanted to be different, have shifted to the term "Imam." The Shi'ites focus their belief on a hereditary line from Muhammed through twelve Imams, starting with Ali. The twelfth Imam is believed to be in "occultation," meaning he is among the living and is going to reappear in due time to bring justice to mankind, to save the world, and to complete God's mission on earth. His representatives are the ayatollahs and the mullahs. However, the Shi'ite clergy does not have a hierarchy to speak of. (74)

Sunni Islam stresses the "importance of the earthly Islamic community and reconciliation of the Prophet's teachings with evolving conditions without jeopardizing the community's purity." On the other hand, Shi'a Islam puts emphasis on the "relationship of man to the religious leadership" and is "generally fundamentalist." (75)

During the Pahlavi dynasty, Shi'a Islam in Iran had greatly influenced the lives of the people. The reason was not that it was the official state religion as provided for in the Iranian Constitution, because that was on paper only. But the reason was that it was with the Iranian the moment he was born up to the time of his death. As described by one author:

The world view of the Persian is determined more than anything else by religion - the Persian is born, lives and dies with verses of the Qur'an echoing in his ears. The universe in which he lives is one that is created and sustained by Allah - who is at once the origin and end of all things. His will reigns supreme over both the

70. The Middle East, Congressional Quarterly Inc., pp. 99-113, reproduced in P551 Booklet, USACGSC, 1983-1984, p. 91-105.
71. Ibid. The Philippines Daily Express, 27 February 1979, p. 2, and The Times Journal (Manila), 16 February 1979, p. 2.
72. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1980).
73. The Middle East, Congressional Quarterly, p. 103; and The Times Journal (Manila), 16 February 1979, p. 2.
74. Ibid.
75. Donald Snow, "The Multiple Faces of the Middle East" (1981), p. 103.
76. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Ithna Ashari Shi'ism and Iranian Islam," in A.J. Arberry, ed., Religion in the Middle East, Vol. 2 (1969), p. 193. See also Ali-Reza Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts (1978), pp. 36-37; and Mohamed Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (1982), p. 208.
77. Koran (4:59); Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 237; Khomeyni, Islamic Government (1979), p. 4; Jack Miklos, The Iranian Revolution and Modernization (1983), p. 23; William Schweitzer, "Foreign Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (1982), p. 13; and The Times Journal (Manila), 16 February 1979, p. 2.
78. Herbert Vreeland, ed., Iran (1957), p. 8. See also Donald Vought, "Iran," in Richard Gabriel, ed., Fighting Armies: Antagonists in the Middle East (1983), p. 102.
79. This theme appears in almost all the utterances of Khomeini.
80. William Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army" (1982), p. 20; and Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, p. 226.
81. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Ithna Ashari Shi'ism," in Arberry, ed., Religion in the Middle East, Vol. 2, pp. 96-118; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, pp. 321-322.
82. Miklos, The Iranian Revolution and Modernization, p. 54. See also John Stempel, Inside the Iranian

58. George, "An Interview with the Shi'ite Leader," in Nobari, ed., *Iran Erupts*, p. 13; Ali Shari'ati, *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies* (1980); and Ali Shari'ati, *On the Sociology of Islam* (1979).
59. Khomeyni, "Khomeyni Interview on Islamic Revolutionary Movement" (1979), p. 16.
60. Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 6; Mohammadi, "Social Change in Iran," pp. 257-262; and Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, p. 149. See also Note 26.
61. *Bulletin Today* (Manila), 14 February 1979, p. 2; *Bulletin Today* (Manila), 22 February 1979, p. 3; Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (1979), p. 206; Nikki Keddie, *Iran*, p. 233; and Khomeyni, "Khomeyni Interview on Islamic Revolutionary Movement," p. 17.
62. *Bulletin Today* (Manila), 14 February 1979, p. 2; and Mohammadi, "Social Change in Iran," pp. 257-262.
63. Khomeyni, "Khomeyni Interview on Islamic Revolutionary Movement," p. 18; Mohammadi, *ibid.*, p. 244; Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, p. 182; and Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, p. 200.
64. Atherton, "Iran: Reform and Human Rights," p. 5; and Mohammadi, *ibid.*, pp. 268-269.
65. Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 7; Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, pp. 262 and 279; *Sunday Times Journal* (Manila), 18 February 1979, p. 2; and *Times Journal* (Manila), 22 February 1979, p. 1.
66. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, p. 93; Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (1979), pp. 236-238; Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 6; Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, p. 162; and Richard Falk, "Balance Sheet on a Revolution," *The Nation* (U.S.A.), 17 January 1981, p. 42.
67. Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 7; Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, pp. 101 and 169; and Davoud Ghandchi-Tehrani, "Bazaaris and Clergy" (1982).
68. Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 323.
69. William Forbis, *Fall of the Peacock Throne* (1980); Mohamed Heikal, *Iran: The Untold Story* (1982); and Nikki Keddie, *Roots of Revolution* (1981).

is that "on 29 October last year, Khomeini's son died in mysterious circumstances in Iran" (Lucien George, "An Interview with the Shi'ite Leader," in Nobari, ed., *Iran Erupts*, p. 9).

47. This will be explained in detail in Chapter VI.
48. Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, p. 163; and Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, p. 166. See also Note 38.
49. Abul Kasim Mansur, "The Crisis in Iran," *Armed Forces Journal International*, Vol. 78, January 1979, p. 31; and Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, p. 182. See also Note 38.
50. For details of this period, please see Chapter VI.
51. Khomeyni, "Selected Articles and Interviews."
52. James Bill, "Power and Religion in Revolutionary Iran" (1982), p. 22; Nobari, ed., *Iran Erupts*, p. 1; Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, pp. 145-174; and Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, pp. 90 and 182.
53. Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 338-339. See also Richard Frye, *Iran: A Country Study* (1978), pp. 18-27; George, "An Interview with the Shi'ite Leader," in Nobari, ed., *Iran Erupts*, pp. 9 and 20; Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," pp. 2-3; Miklos, *The Iranian Revolution and Modernization*, pp. 23-24 and 31; Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 322; and Carl Yates, "Iran - Country Study" (1982), p. 12.
54. "Iran Survey," *Europa Yearbook*, Vol. 2, 1980, p. 531; Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, pp. 182 and 199; and *The Times Journal* (Manila), 16 February 1979, p. 2.
55. George, "An Interview with the Shi'ite Leader," in Nobari, ed., *Iran Erupts*, p. 20.
56. Alfred Atherton, "Iran: Reform and Human Rights" (1976), p. 5; and Farhas Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran: The Uneasy Symbiosis," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim, eds., *Towards a Modern Iran* (1980), pp. 224-233. See also Notes 24 and 25.
57. Mohammadi, "Social Change in Iran" (1982), pp. 266-268; and Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, pp. 145-174.

Iranian Revolution," p. 5; Ayatollah Khomeyni, "Khomeyni Interview on Islamic Revolutionary Movement" (1979), p. 8; Khomeini, Islam and Revolution; Poursaade, "Conditions for Revolution," p. 282; and William Schweitzer, "Foreign Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (1982), p. 12. The title "Ayatollah," meaning "example of God," is in Shi'a Islam generally bestowed on high-ranking religious scholars and has been applied to Khomeini. However, since his role has been unique among religious scholars of Iran, many believe that such role has exceeded what is implied in the title "Ayatollah" and they have therefore started calling him "Imam" in the sense of "leader." (See Note 38 and Lucien George, "An Interview with the Shi'ite Leader," in Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, p. 9.)

41. Banisadr, "Instead of the Shah, An Islamic Republic," in Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, p. 3.
42. There are several versions of this death. One is that Ayatullah Mustafa was murdered by bandits (Algar's notes in Khomeini, Islam and Revolution); another is that he was killed by Reza Shah's police (Schweitzer, "Foreign Policies," p. 12, and "Iran Survey," Europa Yearbook, Vol. 2, 1980, p. 531); the third version is that he died during the reign of Reza Shah (Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 5); and still another is that Reza Shah had been blamed for his death (John Smith, "Where Was the Shah's Army?" (1980), p. 13).
43. Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, "Iran's Foreign Devils," Foreign Affairs (1980), pp. 25-26; Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 104; and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, p. 6.
44. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, pp. 139 and 164.
45. Lucien George, "An Interview with the Shi'ite Leader," in Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, p. 11, and William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (1981), p. 141. See also Note 38.
46. There are several versions of the death of Hajj Mustafa. One is that he died in a freak auto accident planned by SAVAK (Smith, "Where Was the Shah's Army?" p. 31); another one is that he was assassinated by SAVAK (Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 5, and Algar's notes in Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 19); a 'still another

29. Kamal Argheyd, "The Role of Value Systems" (1978), pp. 144-174; Delagah, "The Educational Consequences of the White Revolution" (1975), pp. 173-194; Rouhullah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981); Miklos, The Iranian Revolution, pp. 31-32; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Aryamehr, The White Revolution (1967), pp. 15 and 25-150; and Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 101-129.
30. Khomeyni, "Selected Articles and Interviews" (1977), p. 20; and John Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (1981), p. 6.
31. John Stempel, Ibid., p. 6.
32. Miklos, The Iranian Revolution, p. 33.
33. Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 175.
34. Habib, "Sale of F-16's to Iran," pp. 1-2. "Point 4 program" is so named because the program was the fourth point in President Truman's speech. The program proposed to help developing nations in the various areas such as industry, agriculture, and health (Mohammadi, "Social Change in Iran," p. 237).
35. Ibid., p. 2; Mohammadi, "Social Change in Iran," p. 250; New York Times, 2 January 1978; and Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 34 and 150-152.
36. Bulletin Today (Manila), 26 February 1979, p. 6; Robert Irani, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79" (1980), p. 1; Rouhullah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981), p. 324; Mahmood Poursanaie, "Conditions for Revolution: The Case of Iran" (1981), p. 254; and Cyrus Vance, "Iran, Cambodia, China" (1979), p. 4.
37. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 324.
38. Unless specifically stated otherwise, most of the information in this short biography of Khomeini comes from the annotations of Hamid Algar in Rouhullah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution.
39. This question was asked by Empress Farah, wife of the Shah, in April 1978 (Mohamed Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story, 1982, Preface).
40. Lucien George, "An Interview with the Shi'ite Leader Ayatollah Khomeini," in Ali-Reza Nobari, ed., Iran Exports (1978), p. 20; Irani, "The

Status of Teacher-Education Programs in Iran" (1980), pp. 5-8. Relatedly, Ayatollah Khomeini made the following remark: "History says that the most honorable prophet said: 'The king of kings - shahanshah - is the most detestable word to me.' This is because attributing royalty to man is a transgression against the true king. The true king is God for Whom the rule belongs. There is no king other than Him" (Khomeyni, "Selected Articles and Interviews").

22. Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 50-65.
23. For the text of the treaty, please see George Lenczowski, Russian and the West in Iran: 1918-1948 (1949), pp. 319-322. For details of Iran's foreign relations, see also Sharam Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (1974); and Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy (1975).
24. The Shah believed that the Russians and the British were responsible for the formation of the Tudeh (Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 73-74). See also Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (1982), pp. 281-415.
25. Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 69-77; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Volume XXVI (1980), p. 30537. For an account of the Azerbaijan Rebellion with emphasis on the role of Mossadegh (or Mussadeq), please see Faramarz Fatemi, The U.S.S.R. in Iran (1980), pp. 75-177.
26. Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (1964), Chapters 13 and 15; Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 79-92; Donald Wilber, Contemporary Iran (1963), Chapter 4; and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Volume XXVI, p. 30537. For a detailed account of the CIA involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh, please see Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup (1979); and Richard Preece, U.S. Policy toward Iran (1979). For another version of this event, see Fatemi, The U.S.S.R. in Iran, pp. 178-187.
27. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 56.
28. Miklos, The Iranian Revolution, p. 28. For a good description of the period from 1953 onward, please see Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (1978); James Bill, The Politics of Iran (1972); and Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (1979).

Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 49-53; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 46-49; Richard Nyrop, Iran: A Country Study (1978), pp. 51-53; and Otto Von Pivka, Armies of the Middle East (1979), pp. 99-102.

17. Peter Avery, Modern Iran (1965); E.A. Bayne Persian Kingship in Transition (1968); Darrel Eglin, Character and Structure of the Iranian Economy (1978), pp. 241-244; Richard Frye, Iran (1953), pp. 62-77; Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 3-23; Nikki Keddie, Iran: Religion, Politics and Society (1980); George Lenczowski, ed., Iran under the Pahlavis (1978); Nyrop, Iran: A Country Study, pp. 181-186; Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (1978), pp. 469-489; Warren Soneman, "Iran - Emerging Super Power of the Persian Gulf" (1975), pp. 2-4; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 50-53; Joseph Upton, History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation (1960), p. 49; Donald Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran (1975); and Carl Yates, "Iran - Regional Country Study" (1982), pp. 2-3.
18. The Iranian armed forces did not put up a fight. According to the Shah (Answer to History, pp. 67-68), it was because Reza Shah, in agreement with his generals, ordered his forces to lay down their arms. However, according to General Mohammad Vali Gharani, the first Chief of Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Associated Press, "Lack of Dedication Blamed for Collapse of Iran's Army," The Sunday Times Journal (Manila), 18 February 1979, p. 1), it was because the "army commanders who always claimed they were dedicated to the monarchy were the first to desert in September 1941 when the young Soviet army confronted them."
19. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, p. 24; Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 66-68; and Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 52-53.
20. Imam Reza was a descendant of Ali, who in Shi'ism was the chief lieutenant of Mohammed. Ali was as much to Mohammed as St. Peter was to Jesus Christ. (Please see Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 55-57.)
21. Mansour Delagah, "The Educational Consequences of the White Revolution" (1975), pp. 4-9; and Houshang Farivar, "A Descriptive Survey of the

which was signed on the same date by Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar. The first document pertains to the organization, duties, rights and procedures of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate. The second document is about the state religion, boundaries, capital and flag of Iran; rights of the people; powers of the state; rights of the throne; ministries; powers of the courts; provincial and district councils; finance; and army. The Constitution had been amended several times starting with the first amendment in 1925. For the text of the Constitution, see Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 50-76. For a detailed study of the causes, conditions, goals and results of the constitutional movement, and also the text of the constitution, please refer to Farhang Holakouee-Naeinee, "The Constitutional Revolution of Iran, 1906" (1974).

13. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 13-22, and Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 38-48.
14. Some authors claim that the British engineered the rise to power of Reza Shah. Please see Peter Avery, Modern Iran (1965), p. 228, and Denis Wright, The English Amongst the Persians During the Qajar Period, 1787-1921 (1977), p. 183. For a history of the Persian Cossack Brigade, please see Firuz Kazemzadeh, "The Origins and Early Development of the Persian Cossack Brigade," American Slavic and East European Review (October 1956), pp. 351-363.
15. The Iranian Constitution was amended for the first time on 12 December 1925 when a constituent assembly transferred the reign to the Pahlavi dynasty by approving that the "Constitutional Monarchy of Iran is vested ... in the person of His Imperial Majesty Reza Shah Pahlavi and his male descendants in succession." Ayatollah Khomeini, during his declaration on 6 September 1978, commented that Reza Shah "had the provision establishing the Pahlavi dynasty inserted in the constitution by force." (Please see Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981), p. 235.) In his book Iran Under the Pahlavis (1978), p. 435, George Lenczowski refers to the said constituent assembly as "specially called." By the way, Khomeini's translator Hamid Algar calls Lenczowski as "an academic apologist for the Pahlavi regime" (Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 313).
16. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, p. 22;

Chapter III End Notes

1. For a brief account of Iranian history, please refer to Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (1961), pp. 15-28; Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (1980), pp. 35-61; Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran (1971), pp. 7-25; The Encyclopedia Americana (1979), pp. 368-386; Encyclopedia International (1980), pp. 394-402; and The New Encyclopedia Britannica (1980), pp. 821-872.
2. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 27-31 and p. 61.
3. Philip Habib, "Sale of F-16's to Iran" (1976), p. 1; Jack Miklos, The Iranian Revolution and Modernization (1983), p. 19; Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 34; B. Rubin, et. al., "Iran's Future and U.S. Policy" (1982), p. 1; and Cyrus Vance, "Proposed Sale of AWACS to Iran" (1977), p. 1.
4. William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (1981), p. 20.
5. Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 99; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 106.
6. Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 93.
7. Ibid., p. 35.
8. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 2-3.
9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 9-12; Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 36-48; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 45-46; and Miklos, The Iranian Revolution and Modernization, pp. 19-20.
11. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 13-22; and Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 38-48.
12. The Iranian Constitution of 1906-1907 consists of two documents, namely: Fundamental Law regulating the National Consultative Assembly which was signed on 30 December 1906 by Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah, Mohammad Ali Qajar (Heir Apparent) and Moshir-ed-Dowleh (Prime Minister); and Supplementary Constitutional Law of 8 October 1907

Although the Iranians have been ruled by several conquerors, they have somehow managed to maintain their national identity. The Shah, even before the revolution, had already shown his indecisiveness in times of crisis. His arch-enemy, Ayatollah Khomeini, started actively opposing him when he began implementing his "White Revolution" or modernization program which the members of the clergy perceived to be directed against them. Khomeini became the rallying point for all opponents of the Shah which included the clergy, the Tudeh or communist party, the liberals, the radicals, the students, and the bazaar. Shi'a Islam, which does not recognize the sovereignty of any monarch or head of state, was a strong motivating force for the Iranians. Khomeini made use of this belief in urging the people to oppose the Shah. The Iranians had strong cultural values which the Shah failed to consider. One such value which came out strongly during the revolution was the closeness of the family. It is hoped that with this overview the role of the armed forces during the revolution can be put in its proper perspective.

around the country awakened new interest and confidence in Islam, not merely as a private form of worship, but as a total world-view, fully autonomous, superior to the creeds and ideologies of past and present, and bearing in its heart a revolutionary mission. A large number of the secularly educated intelligentsia who had become alienated from Islam - and thereby from their society and the masses of the Iranian nation - were drawn again to Islam as the pivotal point of both personal existence and national destiny by the eloquence, range and originality of Shari'ati's thought. (86)

What about the Shah? What contributions had he made to Islam and Shi'ism? According to the Shah, who was a Shi'ite himself, he had "never ceased to be the defender" of Islam. He further said:

I believe that the essence of Islam is justice, and that I followed the holy Koran when I decreed and organized a national, communal solidarity, when our White Revolution abolished privilege and redistributed wealth and income more equitably. (87)

Obviously, very few Iranians believed the Shah. For the people sided with Khomeini's group in the belief that the Shah was doing exactly what his father Reza Shah had done - "eliminating the enlightened rules of the Koran and the influence of the message." (88)

Summary

This chapter gives an overview of Iran, the Shah, the Shah's opponents and Shi'a Islam. Iran is important to several countries of the world because of its strategic geographic location and its large oil and mineral deposits.

one reporter, "Each member of the faith follows the teachings of the mullahs he prefers, ones who share his interests, and whose advice helps him to resolve everyday problems." (83) Of the members of the clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the most popular and influential. He had words for every segment of the Iranian society. Despite his deep hatred for the Shah and the military establishment, he paid particular attention to the individual members of the armed forces and oftentimes included them in his declarations. As a matter of fact, one of his first pronouncements in 1963 was about the armed forces and Islam:

It causes us not the least concern that the sons of Islam should be drafted into the army. Let our young men enter the barracks, educate our troops, and raise their level of thinking; let a few enlightened and freedom-loving people appear among our troops so that, by the grace of God Almighty, Iran may attain its dignity and freedom. We know that the commanders of the great Iranian army, its respectable officers, and its noble members share our aims and are ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the dignity of Iran. (84)

Of the lay political philosophers, a young man named Ali Shariati, who had been one of the Shah's political prisoners and who had died in London only a few months before the revolution, (85) was undoubtedly the most influential. As noted by a respected professor:

In all the diverse speeches, lectures and writings of Shari'ati, there is barely a single reference to the political, economic and other miseries of Pahlavi Iran, and yet it is necessary now to designate him as the chief ideologue of the Iranian Islamic revolution. His lectures ...

while doing battle in the cause of Islam was martyrdom, which assured immediate entry into heaven. According to Khomeini, "to kill and be killed for God is an honor." (80) This would explain why many unarmed Iranians were willing to confront fully armed soldiers and die and be a "martyr" in the process.

The Iranians mourned over their dead for a long period of time. However, they gave particular attention to the fortieth day after the death and every fortieth day thereafter. During deep mourning periods, they were extremely irritable. (81)

In the matter of personal relationships among the Iranians, the closeness of the family stood out. As aptly described by one observer:

For almost all Iranians, the reciprocal obligations and privileges that define relations between kinsmen, from the parent-child bond to more distant ones, are more important than those associated with any other kind of social alignment. Economic, political, and other forms of institutional activity are significantly colored by family ties, even if the nature of these activities is not necessarily determined by such ties. This holds not only for the biological family of parents and offspring, but also for the aggregate of kinsmen, near and distant, who, taken together, represent "the family" at its outermost boundary. (82)

If Islam and Shi'ism had made a strong impact on the Iranians, including the personnel of the armed forces, such influence had been reinforced by the teachings of both the clergy and lay philosophers. Of course, the members of the clergy were always there with the people. According to

world of nature and the lives of men and their societies. (76)

The effects of Shi'a Islam had been reflected in the beliefs, customs and practices of the Iranians. Some of the relevant ones are enumerated here.

The Shi'ites, unlike the Sunnis, had been taught not to recognize the sovereignty of any monarch or head of state. According to Khomeini, "only the Imams or those who act on their behalf are the legitimate holders of authority; all other governments are illegitimate." In contrast, the Sunnis had accepted that rulers should be obeyed as the legitimate holders of authority. The conflict arose from the interpretation of a passage in the Quran which says, "O you who believe, obey God, and obey the Messenger and the holders of authority from among you." Because of this Shi'ite teaching, there was a basic contradiction in the Iranian Constitution which recognized both "constitutional monarchy" as the form of government and Shi'a Islam as the state religion of Iran. (77)

The people of Iran had been known for their "profound search into the will and way of God and the human spirit," and had sought to "identify themselves with God." (78) Khomeini had successfully made use of this belief by convincing the people that opposition to the Shah was a performance of duty to God. (79)

Another related belief of the Iranians was the matter of dying in battle. For devout Muslims, to die

Revolution (1981), p. 13; and Vought, "Iran," in Gabriel, ed., Fighting Armies, pp. 91-92.

83. Thierry Brun, "The Roots of Popular Agitation in Iran," in Ali-Reza Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts (1978), p. 38.
84. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981), p. 176.
85. There are conflicting versions of the circumstances of his death. One is that he died of cancer (Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 92); another is that he died "under mysterious circumstances that suggest the almost certain involvement of the Iranian secret police, on June 19, 1977" (Hamid Algar, "Translator's Foreword" to Ali Shari'ati, On the Sociology of Islam (1979), p. 6).
86. Hamid Algar, "Preface," in Ali Shari'ati, Marxism and Other Fallacies (1980), pp. 7-14. For compilations of Shari'ati's speeches and writings, see Shari'ati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies (1980); Shari'ati, On the Sociology of Islam (1979); and "Ali Shariati," Iran Free Press (1979). See also Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 92.
87. Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 60.
88. Khomeyni, "Selected Articles and Interviews" (1977), p. 19.

CHAPTER IV

AN OVERVIEW OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES

Much of what the Iranian armed forces did before and during the revolution would be better understood if one has a good grasp of their history, organization, relationship with the Shah, relationship with the United States, and relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini and the clergy. This chapter discusses these topics with that end in mind.

History of the Armed Forces

Before the Pahlavi dynasty, Iran never had a standing national army. (1) The rulers of Iran just relied on separate armed groups and tribal support to fight wars or repel invaders. This was true even during the Qajar dynasty whose rulers attempted to use several methods for enlisting fighting men. In the later part of the Qajar regime, just before Reza Shah came to power, only three units could be considered as effective fighting forces: the Gendarmerie established by the Swedes in 1911 for the

protection of the rural areas; the South Persian Rifles created by the British in 1916 to protect British interests in the southern part of Iran; and the Persian Cossack Brigade, the unit which helped Reza Shah in ousting the last Qajar monarch. (2)

When Reza Shah came to power, he dissolved some units and forces and integrated the rest into a unified national army. Then he convinced the parliament to pass a law requiring all men at the age of twenty-one to render compulsory active military service for two years and reserve duty for twenty-three years. He also established military schools. Some selected officers were sent abroad for training. A short time later, he created a naval unit and an air force. In less than twenty years, he was able to transform "a potpourri of inefficient and divergent forces into an organized and effective military establishment." He effectively used the military forces in bringing order to the whole country under central government authority. The military therefore became "the chief political instrument of Reza Shah's reign." (3)

Although 400,000 men were mobilized for World War II, the military did not put up a fight against the invading Russian and British soldiers. (4) However, it did support the young Mohammad Reza Shah, who took over from his father after Reza Shah was forced to abdicate, in his effort to regain control of the rebellious provinces of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan in 1946. Thus the Iranian

military was able to restore its prestige which was lost during the war and it once again emerged as an important force in maintaining order. By this time, the Shah had realized the crucial significance of the military for the preservation of the Pahlavi throne. (5)

The Shah's control over the armed forces was disputed by Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953. When Mossadegh fell in a coup d'etat, (6) wherein the armed forces helped in bringing the Shah back to power, one of the first acts of the Shah was to establish absolute control of the armed forces. The discovery of the Tudeh military network in 1954 caused the Shah to make such control much tighter. To put an end to subversive activities such as those undertaken by the Tudeh, he created the Sazman-e Ettela'at Va Amniyat-e Keshvar (Iranian State Intelligence and Security Organization), better known as the SAVAK, in 1957. This period, beginning 1953, also marked the rapid increase in the size and quality of the armed forces characterized by a heavy assistance from the United States. (7)

Another significant event in their history was the Shah's utilization of the armed forces to quell the riots of 1963. (8) By this action, he was able to silence the opposition, at least up to mid-1970's. His experience in this period made him confident that the armed forces could easily handle any domestic disturbances that might arise, so he began to develop an outward-looking military force.

When the British withdrew from east of the Suez in 1968, the Shah took upon himself the burden of protecting the Persian Gulf. This meant having strong armed forces. (9)

By mid-1970's, the Iranian armed forces were indeed strong. Although untested under modern combat conditions, they were one of the largest forces, if not the largest, in the region. They had plenty of modern equipment; they even had more "chieftain" tanks than the British army. And they could now afford to send advisers and troops to fight rebels in Yemen and Oman and participate in the United Nations peace-keeping efforts. (10)

Organization of the Armed Forces

As stated earlier, this paper uses the term "armed forces" to refer to the military establishment, the SAVAK, and the police. (11)

The military establishment was under the Ministry of War. It used to be called the Imperial Iranian Army consisting of land, air and naval forces. Later, in mid-1970's, it became the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces consisting of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF), the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAG), and the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN). In 1979, the total military personnel strength was close to 500,000. (12)

The Ground Forces was the largest and most established of the three military services. In 1978,

having a strength close to 300,000 personnel, it accounted for the bulk of Iran's military manpower. It consisted of 3 armored divisions, 4 infantry divisions, 4 independent brigades (1 armored, 1 infantry, 1 airborne and 1 special force), 4 SAM battalions with "Hawk," other supporting artillery units, and the Army Aviation Command. One of the infantry divisions, known as the Imperial Guards Division, had the mission of providing security to the Shah and his family and his places of residence especially the Niavaran Palace in Northern Tehran. In terms of equipment, the Ground Forces was no doubt a modern army. It had around 2,000 British and American tanks, 2,000 American and Russian armored personnel carriers, 4,000 artillery guns and anti-tank weapons, some "Hawk" missiles, and 400 assorted aircraft. (13)

The Air Force was said to be the pride and joy of the Shah. This could be attributed to his being a pilot and his love of flying. In 1978, its personnel strength was more than 100,000. Of the three military services, the Air Force received the bulk of the funds available for modernization and was the most technologically advanced. It consisted of eleven subordinate commands, namely: five Tactical Fighter Commands, Air Defense Command, Air Transport Command, Air Training Command, Logistics Command, Communications-Electronics-Meteorology Command, and Support Command. Its inventory, which was one of the most modern in the world, included 32 F-4D, 177 F-4E, 12 F-5A, 140

F-5E, 56 F-14A, 160 F-16A/B, 23 F-27, 4 F-28, 13 Boeing 707, 6 Boeing 747, 64 C-130, 3 Aero Comdr-690, 4 Falcon-20, 16 RF-4E, and 300 other assorted aircraft including 50 helicopters. Many more, including AWACS, were to be delivered to Iran when the revolution came. The Air Force had the usual missions of any air force, plus the air defense mission, including operation of ground-to-air missiles. (14)

The Navy was the smallest of the three military services. It had less than 50,000 personnel. But it was being modernized to make it capable of performing sea control missions not only in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz but also along the vital oil sea lines of communication from the Persian Gulf to Japan and Europe. In 1978, it had 3 destroyers, 4 frigates, 4 corvettes, 20 patrol boats, 5 minesweepers, 2 landing ships, 2 logistic support ships, 8 SRN-6, and 6 hovercraft. On order were 4 Spruance Class destroyers, 3 Tang Class submarines, 12 fast patrol boats with Exocet SSM's, and 2 landing craft. It also had 3 marine battalions and a naval air unit. It was indeed a respectable regional force, being the only Middle East navy in possession of modern destroyers and frigates and enjoying superiority in sophisticated equipment over neighboring countries including Egypt, Israel and Iraq. (15)

The military personnel could be categorized into four classes, namely: officers, warrant officers,

non-commissioned officers, and conscripts. Entry into the officer corps guaranteed high pay, special importation privileges, living quarters, servants, and special discount stores. The warrant and non-commissioned officers came largely from the urban middle class. However, the NCO's, who had risen from the ranks, were generally ardent supporters of the Shah, while the warrant officers were mainly anti-Shah. The warrant officers were highly trained specialists who occupied technical positions but had not been granted privileges enjoyed by the officer corps. The two-year conscripts were mostly uneducated and were drawn from the lower classes of Iranian society, especially the rural areas, the same classes that produced many of the demonstrating crowds. The conscripts performed the menial tasks in the military, including household work for senior officers. The majority of the Ground Forces personnel were conscripts, while the Air Force and Navy personnel were mostly volunteers. While the officers received high salary and several privileges, the regular soldiers' salary was only slightly higher than that of the unskilled workers and the conscripts' salary was negligible. Military personnel, particularly the conscripts, were generally assigned to places away from their homes; it was believed by the regime that they would more likely shoot a stranger if necessary than harm their friends and relatives. (16)

The SAVAK, (17) the national intelligence and security organization, was supposed to be under the

supervision of the Office of the Prime Minister but it in fact was directly responsible to the Shah. It had around 6,000 personnel augmented by many part-time informers. It was originally intended as an intelligence-gathering agency not only for Iran but also for the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). However, as time went by, especially after the rebellions led by Khomeini in 1963, the SAVAK became more than just an intelligence organization because it assumed the functions of a political police force. In its efforts to combat the terrorist organizations that came out in the 1960's, it used methods that gave it the reputation for cruelty and indignity. It was believed by the Shah's detractors that this much-feared heavy-handed Iranian secret police was created by him in order to avoid what happened to his deposed father by hunting and neutralizing his enemies before they could start doing something against him. Significantly, the important positions in the SAVAK, particularly its director, were usually held by military officers. (18)

There were two police organizations in Iran: the Gendarmerie or rural police and the Municipal Police or urban police. Both performed law enforcement duties and were under the Ministry of Interior. They were of para-military nature and many of their officers were provided by the Army. The Gendarmerie, which had a personnel strength of around 75,000 in 1978, was the state police responsible for areas outside city limits. It was

intended to take over from the Army the task of maintaining law and order so the Army could concentrate in the main task of national defense. It was a highly mobile force, equipped with patrol aircraft and watercraft. Its units were stationed in strategic points all over the country and were provided with a communications system that allowed them to get in touch with each other. The Municipal Police took care of law enforcement in the cities. Together with the other armed forces units, it was included in the modernization program of the Shah. Most of the police officers were graduates of the Police University and sent to the provinces on periodic-rotation basis. (19)

The Shah and the Armed Forces

The relationship between the Shah and the armed forces started as early as the 1920's when his father rose to power and controlled the government of Iran with the help of the military. In 1953, it was also with the help of the military that the Shah regained full control of the government which was taken away from his father during World War II. (20)

According to the Iranian Constitution, the "Commander-in-Chief of all the land and sea forces is the Monarch in person." (21) One reason for this provision was given by the Shah when he said: "In this country, if the King is not the commander-in-chief of the armed forces,

anything can happen." (22) This belief of the Shah was reflected in the way he controlled the armed forces.

On paper, the military services had their own chiefs who, together with the single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, formed the Supreme Military Council (23) which was supposed to be the planning and control center for the Shah. However, in practice, each of the services was literally headed by the Shah. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces did not have the kind of authority given to the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Council did not have a coordinated command structure with its own integral staff. Instead, the Chief of Staff only coordinated the plans, programs and budget; and the service chiefs, as well as the commanders of the Gendarmerie and the Municipal Police and the director of the SAVAK, reported directly to the Shah for all matters concerning the funding, organization and direction of their own services and agencies. The Shah made decisions not only on major policy issues but also on routine matters, leaving little room for initiative on the part of the service or agency head. (24) The Shah described his meetings with the key officers as follows:

In keeping with my role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, I set aside two mornings a week mainly for meetings with the chiefs of the military establishment and with other officers who bring first-hand reports from all parts of the country. To encourage them to speak freely and frankly, I usually receive such officers individually. (25)

The Shah used other methods to control the armed forces, such as handpicking officers for sensitive positions, raising the salaries of personnel and giving privileges to officers, giving priority to the modernization program of the armed forces over the other national needs, "divide and rule" technique, utilizing armed forces personnel for traditionally civilian functions, and requiring personnel to recite daily an oath of allegiance. (26)

The Shah personally selected officers who were "fanatically loyal" to him to fill positions of chiefs not only of services but also of intelligence units whom he used as his "eyes and ears." He also supervised the assignment of personnel and equipment, seeing to it that selected units received first priority. (27)

On the matter of material benefits to the armed forces personnel, the Shah raised their salaries from time to time, notwithstanding the difficult economic situation of Iran. However, as earlier pointed out, the Shah seemed not to be aware that those in the lower ranks were not as happy as the senior officers in terms of pay and privileges. (28)

The Shah implemented his program to modernize the armed forces to the detriment of the other needs of Iran. In 1943, when one of his advisers urged him to reduce the size of the standing army because "if the Army budget were increased we could do little if anything for agriculture,

education, or public health," the Shah was reported to have replied: "Very well, then; we'll have to postpone those things." This sense of value remained unchanged until the fall of the Shah. (29)

Factions or groups within the armed forces were effectively controlled by the Shah. He was very careful in not allowing any officer to become too powerful. Before an officer could derive too much power or influence, that officer was either retired, demoted or transferred. The Shah also saw to it that only officers who would not be a threat to him were promoted. Through a method of "divide and rule," he assigned overlapping duties for intelligence-gathering to different organizations, thus making sure that all developments within or outside the armed forces were reported to him. (30)

Although the Shah officially emphasized the separation of the armed forces from politics, in practice they played a significant role in the political system. For the armed forces assumed responsibilities in such traditionally civilian matters as literacy, health and development programs, and administration of justice thru the military tribunals. Military officers from time to time occupied key civilian positions, such as members of the Cabinet, heads of government institutions and agencies, governors of provinces, and mayors of major cities. (31)

One method of controlling the armed forces, by inculcating loyalty to the Shah, involved all armed forces

personnel. Every member had to recite, every morning, a pledge of allegiance to "God, Shah and Country." It should be noted that in this oath, the "Shah" came before "Country." (32)

The United States and the Iranian Armed Forces

The story of the Iranian armed forces would not be complete without including the aspect of their relationship with the United States. For the United States played an important role in their development. As the Shah himself acknowledged: "For help in bringing about many improvements in our armed services we are indebted to the Americans." (33)

As early as 1943, a small American mission began to advise Iran on the Gendarmerie. In the late forties and early fifties, President Truman included Iran in his Mutual Security Program. In 1951, a full-pledged military assistance and advisory group was established in Iran in order to give advice on military organization and training, and manage the delivery of military aid, in the form of equipment and supplies, which the U.S. was giving to Iran. Such aid continued, in varying degrees, until the fall of the Shah. (34)

The U.S. military mission to Iran was unique. It was so not only because of the diplomatic immunity which the Majlis (Parliament) granted to its personnel in 1965.


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THE ROLE OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE FALL OF THE
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
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Its unique character is described by former Ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, as follows:

From their (Iranians') point of view, the United States military personnel assigned to Iran were integrated into the Iranian forces. At the end of the Shah's regime, all those personnel with the exception of six senior officers were paid for and maintained by Iran. Their salaries, allowances, transportation, the schooling of their children, and all other incidentals were borne by the Iranian government. They wore arm patches indicating that they were members of the Iranian armed forces. (35)

In 1978, the U.S. military mission in Iran was composed of two groups: the ARMISH-MAAG (U.S. Army Mission Headquarters - Military Assistance Advisory Group) and the TAFT's (Technical Assistance Field Teams). The ARMISH-MAAG was concerned with advisory and staff functions of a continuing nature, whereas the TAFT's were "short-term" teams focusing on the introduction of new equipment by "training the trainers." A total of over 1,200 personnel were assigned to the mission. (36)

America's interest was not confined in the military. For the U.S. also had close association with the SAVAK. It was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which devised the framework of the SAVAK. Many SAVAK personnel were trained in the United States. And despite the bad reputation of the SAVAK, President Carter informed Ambassador Sullivan that "the intelligence which we received, particularly from our listening stations focused on the Soviet Union, was of such importance that we should continue the collaboration between our two intelligence

agencies." (37)

How did the opposition view the close relationship between the U.S. and the Iranian armed forces? According to Ayatollah Khomeini:

Militarily, the Shah made us thoroughly dependent on the U.S. (To perpetuate his monarchy) he gave our oil to the U.S. and used the proceeds to build military bases for America in Iran. (38)

Ayatollah Khomeini and the Armed Forces

As earlier mentioned, Ayatollah Khomeini gave special attention to the armed forces. (39) He was careful in his statements not to antagonize the individual members of the armed forces. Instead of alienating them, he tried to win them over to his side. He did this consistently from 1963, when he rose to prominence, up to the fall of the Shah.

In 1965, when the law granting legal immunity to the U.S. military advisers was passed, Khomeini declared: "This document has insulted the great Iranian army and has insulted the army's commanders, officers and troops." When he learned about the close relationship between Israel and the SAVAK, he said:

The officers and troops of the Iranian army must refuse this humiliation and this insult, must think seriously of the independence of their homeland and must find a solution to this bad and deteriorating situation. (40)

By 1978, the conscripts and other armed forces

personnel who were assigned away from their homes had found comfort in the mosques. And there, they had received the teachings of Khomeini and other anti-Shah clerics. (41)

The behavior of the armed forces personnel during the revolution showed the effectiveness of Khomeini and the clergy in dealing with the armed forces. (42)

Summary

In order to facilitate the understanding of much of what the Iranian armed forces did before and during the revolution, this chapter provides an overview of the armed forces, particularly their history, organization, relationship with the Shah, relationship with the U.S., and relationship with Khomeini and the clergy. Although the history of the armed forces could be traced to the time of Cyrus the Great, it was only during the Pahlavi dynasty that Iran had a standing national army. The relationship between the Shah and the armed forces started as early as the 1920's when his father rose to power with the help of the military. It was also with the help of the military that the Shah regained full control of the government which was taken away from his father during World War II. His dream to have a strong armed forces was given flesh through the use of the proceeds from oil and through the almost unlimited support of the United States. However, the development of the armed forces was outward-looking,

emphasizing on the capability to meet external aggression and to project power in the region. To ensure control of the country, the Shah saw to it that the armed forces were under his full control. This would mean that everything about the armed forces should revolve around him. Little did the Shah know that there were dysfunctions in the system which Khomeini had been exploiting.

Chapter IV End Notes

1. There are those who claim that Iran's military tradition goes back more than 2,500 years to the "highly efficient fighting machine" of the Achaemenid rulers. See James Rudolph, "Armed Forces," in Richard Nyrop, ed., *Iran: A Country Study* (1978), p. 390; Donald Vought, "Iran," in Richard Gabriel, ed., *Fighting Armies* (1983), pp. 85-86; Robert Wesson, *The Imperial Order* (1967), p. 23; and Yahya Zoka, *The Imperial Iranian Army from Cyrus the Great to Pahlavi* (1971), p. 7.
2. Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran: 1921-1941* (1961), pp. 53-64; J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (1969), p. 269; Farhad Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran: The Uneasy Symbiosis," in Elie Kedouri and Sylvia Haim, eds., *Towards a Modern Iran* (1980), pp. 218-219; Kazemzadeh, "The Origins and Early Development of the Persian Cossack Brigade" (1956), pp. 351-363; Ann K.S. Lambton, *Islamic Society in Persia* (1954), p. 7; and Donald Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran* (1975).
3. Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran," in Kedouri and Haim, eds., *Towards a Modern Iran*, p. 220. See also Otto Von Pivka, *Armies of the Middle East* (1979), pp. 100-101; Iranian Ministry of Information, *Iran* (1979), pp. 101-102; and Vought, "Iran," in Gabriel, ed., *Fighting Armies*, pp. 89-90.
4. Please see Note 18, Chapter III.
5. Kazemi, p. 220; and Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, p. 73.
6. Please see Note 26, Chapter III.
7. Miklos, *The Iranian Revolution and Modernization*, p. 28; Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran," in Kedouri and Haim, eds., *Towards a Modern Iran*, p. 223; Pahlavi, *Answer to History*, p. 156; and Sullivan, *Mission to Iran*, pp. 73 and 95-96.
8. See Note 30, Chapter III.
9. William Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn" (1982), pp.


2-3; Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran," in Kedouri and Haim, eds., Towards a Modern Iran, pp. 223-224; and Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 13 and 140.

10. Tony Jaepes, SAS Operations in Oman (1980), pp. 161-203; Otto Von Pivka, Armies of the Middle East, p. 102; Time (U.S.A.), 12 November 1978, p. 23; U.S. House of Representatives, "Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Middle East" (1975), p. 19; and U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran" (1976), p. 14.
11. See Chapter I.
12. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, pp. 101-107; John Smith, "Where Was the Shah's Army?" pp. 1-7; and Carl Yates, "Iran - Regional Country Study" (1982), p. 28.
13. Military Balance, 1978-79, p. 37; Pivka, Armies of the Middle East, p. 98; Smith, ibid., pp. 3-4; and U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran," pp. 14-19.
14. Military Balance, 1978-79, p. 37; Pivka, ibid., p. 97; Smith, "Where Was the Shah's Army?" pp. 5-6; and U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran," pp. 25-32.
15. Military Balance, 1978-79, p. 37; Alvin Cottrell, "Iran's Armed Forces under the Pahlavi Dynasty," in George Lenczowski, ed., Iran under the Pahlavis (1978), p. 425; Pivka, ibid., p. 97; and U.S. Senate, ibid., pp. 19-25.
16. Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (1979), pp. 67-72; Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn," pp. 5-6; Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, p. 286; Mahmood Poursarie, "Conditions for Revolution" (1981), pp. 233-240; Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions (1980), pp. 225-226; James Rudolph, "Armed Forces," in Richard Nyrop, ed., Iran: A Country Study (1978), p. 116; and Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (1971), p. 116.
17. Please see Note 7 above for the complete name of SAVAK.
18. Poursarie, "Conditions for Revolution," p. 236; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 96-97; Time (U.S.A.), 18 September 1978, p. 22; and Time

(U.S.A.), 13 November 1978, p. 7. For details of the cruelties and other violations of human rights committed by SAVAK, please see Chapter V.

19. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, p. 106; Military Balance 1978-79, p. 37; Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, p. 142; and Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, pp. 310-311.
20. Please see Chapter III.
21. Article 50.
22. Time (U.S.A.), 27 November 1978, p. 23.
23. Also known as the Supreme Commander's Staff.
24. Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn," pp. 4-5; Poursanai, "Conditions for Revolution," pp. 228-229; and Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 74-75.
25. Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 317.
26. Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn," pp. 4-5; Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran," in Kedourie and Haim, eds., Towards a Modern Iran, pp. 235-236; Poursanai, "Conditions for Revolution," pp. 234-236; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 76-80; and Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, p. 112.
27. Sullivan, ibid., p. 75-78.
28. Hickman, p. 4; Kazemi, pp. 235-236; Poursanai, pp. 234 and 239-240; and Zonis, p. 112.
29. Arthur Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (1946), p. 105; and Poursanai, "Conditions for Revolution," pp. 227-228. This subject is examined in detail in Chapter V.
30. James Bill, The Politics of Iran (1972), pp. 42-44; Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn," p. 5; Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran," in Kedourie and Haim, eds., Towards a Modern Iran, pp. 235-236; and Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, pp. 22-23 and 84-86.
31. Poursanai, "Conditions for Revolution," pp. 234-236. The role of the armed forces in the literacy program is examined in Chapter V.

32. Halliday, Iran, p. 67; Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn," p. 6; Poursandie, ibid., p. 236; and Time (U.S.A.), 27 November 1978, p. 23.
33. Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p. 312.
34. Pahlavi, ibid.; Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 141; and U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran," pp. 33-36.
35. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 74.
36. U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran," pp. 35-37.
37. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 21-22 and 95.
38. "An Interview with Khomeini," Time (U.S.A.), 7 January 1980, p. 27.
39. See Chapter III (Shi'a Islam).
40. Khomeyni, "Selected Articles and Interviews" (1977), pp. 1 and 24.
41. Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn," p. 7.
42. This aspect is analyzed in Chapter VI.



CHAPTER V

THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION

Although the revolution which led to the final overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty was an "outcome of the combined effects of several factors," (1) it would seem that some causes of the revolution were dominant. These causes have always been mentioned in most books, papers, reports, articles and interviews about Iran. (2) The Iranian armed forces are believed to be involved in four of these causes, namely: brutality and other violations of human rights, corruption, economic hardships and excessive military expenditure, and cultural dislocation. This chapter examines the contributions of the armed forces to these causes which led the people of Iran to rise against the Shah.

Brutality and Other Violations of Human Rights

If there was one factor which did the most damage to the Shah, it was this charge of brutality and other violations of human rights. For practically every segment

of the Iranian society was a victim, one way or the other. As summarized by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1977:

The Shah's security agencies are perpetrating the most brutal forms of torture against man's humanity ... Whoever follows a path other than that of the Shah is destined to suffer severe torture, to be denied the simplest human rights, to be accused of black reaction and of unpatriotic leftism and to be completely annihilated finally. (3)

Accusations and evidence of torture focused on the SAVAK, the Gendarmerie (rural police) and the Municipal Police (the nationwide urban police force). Details of torture, brutality and other violations of human rights in Iran can be found in the records of the U.S. Congress and U.S. Department of State; in the reports of the Amnesty International, the Red Cross, and the Iranian Students Association in the United States; and in books, newspapers and magazines. (4)

The following were some of the methods used to torture prisoners and detainees: "toasting" or burning the chest, stomach and back; "battering" with fists and boots; holding the prisoners "incommunicado" for several months; whipping with electrical cables; using the "Apollo machine," a chair in which prisoners were tied while their feet were slashed and they were tortured with electric shock; injecting drugs; pulling fingernails out; attaching weights to the hands; using intense light to the head; hanging weights on the genitals; forcing the neck of a bottle through the anus; using the "parrot's perch" whereby

the prisoners' hands and feet were tied to a horizontal bar where they were kept hanging in this position heads down; using the "helmet," a metal apparatus designed to make the victim's screams reverberate inside his head; and hanging female prisoners naked from the ceiling and burning them with cigarettes. Most of these methods were used to force prisoners to give information, confess to crimes they had been suspected of committing, stop criticism of the Shah, or cooperate with the authorities, or just to frighten them. These accounts of brutality, torture and terror, combined with the charges of denial of political rights and reliance on repressive and insensitive rule, no doubt contributed to the people's hatred to the Shah and his regime. (5)

Where all of these accusations true? Alfred Atherton, Jr., the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House International Relations Committee, stated that "while we have no direct verifiable evidence of this, it is difficult to discount the many persistent reports, particularly in the context of terrorist violence, that there have been cases of harsh methods being used by the Iranian police and security services." The Amnesty International had no doubt at all that these violations were being committed and so it concluded in 1975 that "no country in the world has a worse record in human rights

Let us examine this aspect in detail.

Before the Literacy Corps was organized, over eighty percent of the entire population was illiterate. Most of these people lived in the rural areas. With this number, and considering the increase in population, there was no way that the Ministry of Education, as it was organized, could cope with the situation. So the Shah had to turn to the armed forces to help solve the problem. At that time, military conscription in Iran was compulsory. Every male person reaching the age of eighteen must join the armed forces, unless he was pursuing a higher education in which case he must join the military upon completion of his education. However, the total number of persons eligible for conscription was more than what the armed forces really needed or could absorb. This manpower was available for quasi-military duties. The Shah therefore decided to create the Literacy Corps and to make it as the sixth point of the "White Revolution." (36)

The literacy program called for the selection of military conscripts who had completed 12th grade (high school) to undergo not only the basic military training which lasted eighteen weeks but also the extra eight weeks of "educational instruction" consisting of lectures, discussions and practical exercises. (Please see Table 3 next page for the training program for Literacy Corpsmen.) Those who were finally selected to go to the villages to teach received the rank of sergeant. (37)

Iran, to raise the level of intellectual life not only of the urban population but of the rural Iranians as well, and to make them attuned to the economic, political and social reforms under the "White Revolution." (33) However, these were also some of the major points used by Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates in their attack against the Shah. They charged that the kind of education which the Shah's "reforms" were giving the Iranians was not suited to their culture and religion, and that Western values were emphasized. Khomeini specifically pointed out that the schools and the teachers "worked to lead our children away from their religion" and "succeeded in imparting knowledge, but not an education, an Islamic education." Khomeini further stated:

What the Shah wanted to disseminate in the name of Western culture was nothing other than to spread corruption and to devoid man by depriving him of his identity and the components of his existence and by striking the human ideals and values under the slogan of the Western culture. (34)

In short, for initiating the educational reforms and the Literacy Corps, the Shah was charged with committing "intellectual and moral colonialist aggression" and creating a "painful cultural dislocation." (35)

But what had the armed forces to do with all this? Why blame the armed forces at all? Well, the answer is that most of the teachers in this educational program, especially those sent to the villages, were armed forces personnel. They were the members of the Literacy Corps.

The young men who were brought into the armed forces from the secondary schools - for example, the homofars, who were trained as air force technicians - clearly had the best intellectual potential for handling the Shah's misbegotten industrialization program and for grappling with the forgotten problem of agricultural reform. (30)

Another adverse effect of the Shah's military program was the virtual neglect of domestic security requirements in favor of "deterrence and prestige" (31) equipment and arms. This means that weapons and training for domestic disturbances were not emphasized. There was no stockpile of grenades, tear gas and other weapons to be used against demonstrators. It is no wonder then that a lot of tanks and fighter planes had been deployed in the cities instead of utilizing them in the border areas. The result of this neglect is not difficult to understand, as summarized by one analyst:

Without these essential weapons and the necessary training, when the military was ordered to break up the mass revolutionary demonstrations, it responded with disproportionate force. The casualties sustained from the lethal weapons employed fueled the crisis by providing martyrs and touched off a cycle of increasing violence and repression. (32)

Cultural Dislocation

Two of the main points of the Shah's "White Revolution," later called the "Shah-People Revolution," were the Literacy Corps and the educational reforms. The purposes of these points were to eradicate illiteracy in

a direct impact on the people. (26) As Khomeini pointed out in 1977:

This deal drags the Iranian people to the danger of economic decline and collapse At present, many of the Iranian people are denied the primary necessities of life ... So, how can this regime spend this enormous sum on lowly matters? (27)

In 1978, Abol-Hassan Banisadr, one of the opponents of the Shah who later became the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, also harped on the same theme:

This year (1978), the Shah's regime has allocated more for Defense and Internal Security than for Education, Health, Social Welfare, Urban Development, Rural Development, Housing, and Agriculture combined. The economic health, social welfare, and cultural integrity of the Iranian nation are all being sacrificed so that the Shah can continue to rule Iran within the framework of U.S. strategic objectives. (28)

The second adverse effect of the military modernization program was that it diverted scarce human resources away from social and economic programs and concentrated them on useless military purposes. Much of the military equipment the Shah purchased could not be used immediately, either because Iran was not yet prepared for these items of equipment on the basis of infrastructure and technology, or because they were so complex and advanced that not even the Americans had mastered all aspects. (29) Bringing most of the qualified Iranians into the armed forces at this time was therefore not advisable. As emphasized by former U.S. Ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan:

internal threat, and concluded that these threats to Iran's security seemed to be "sufficiently real and diverse to enable the Shah to justify major investments in military forces ... (and) to make a rational case for high levels of investments in U.S. equipment." Other reasons for the enormous military expenditure could be "to keep the Shah's army loyal; to burnish Iran's international prestige; to prevent revolutionaries ... from taking over in neighboring countries ... ; and to resist separatist movements encouraged by the Soviet Union in either Iran or neighboring countries." (23)

U.S. officials at the time pointed out that the sale of arms and equipment to Iran had satisfied the following conditions: the arms must be fitted to the legitimate security needs of the country concerned and they must contribute to the overall peace in the area. (24) However, Khomeini contradicted this view when he made the following statement:

The oil revenues have at no time been spent to serve the people's interests ... and the oil revenues are not channelled toward the interests of the Iranians because those who plunder our resources impose on us the purchase of their weapons and then set up on our lands military bases to defend their interests and their policies. To serve these interests and policies, they have turned us into the area's policeman. (25)

What were the adverse effects of this ambitious military program? First of all, this military program was implemented to the detriment of the other programs that had

PAGETW 2

U. S. MILITARY SPENDING DATA

YEAR	MILITARY BUDGET
1950-69	757.0
1970	113.2
1971	396.6
1972	519.1
1973	2,157.1
1974	4,373.2
1975	3,021.0
1976	1,456.7
1977	4,213.0
1978-79	19,000.0

SOURCE: Mahmood Poursarie, "Conditions for Revolution: The Case of Iran" (1981), p. 79; based on information from the U.S. Department of Defense and Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East (1979), p. 114.

and Israel. (19)

Iran was the "largest single purchaser of U.S. military equipment," and the Iranian military sales program was the "largest in the world in terms of dollar value and the number of Americans involved in implementing the program, both in Iran and the United States." Sales in the 1972-76 period totalled \$10.4 billion. Many more were ordered after that period. When the Shah fell in 1979, about \$12.6 billion worth of arms and equipment had already been ordered but not yet delivered. (20) (Please refer to Table 2 next page for a tabulation of yearly U.S. military sales to Iran.)

What was this heavy military expenditure for? In 1974, the Shah said, " ... according to our plan, in five years time, Iran would be among the top non-atomic armies of the world." (21) In 1976, a staff report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate made the following observation:

Iran has undertaken a major military expansion and modernization program in recent years to protect its interests from numerous perceived threats. Iranian officials also view the military buildup as the spearhead of a broader program to transform Iran into a modern economic as well as military power within twenty years. (22)

The same staff report stated that the threats to Iran could be classified as threats to the oil, the Soviet threat, the threat from the east and the southeast, and the

TABLE 1

DEFENSE BUDGET (IN MILLIONS OF MILLION RIALS):
1954-1978

YEAR	NATIONAL BUDGET	DEFENSE BUDGET	% DEFENSE
1954	12,456	2,544	20.4
1955	22,154	3,725	16.8
1956	23,445	5,298	22.6
1957	30,829	6,457	20.9
1958	59,660	8,578	21.1
1959	47,320	13,902	23.2
1960	52,504	16,174	30.8
1961	54,761	13,084	27.0
1962	54,667	14,448	26.4
1963	55,743	14,064	25.2
1964	64,151	14,604	22.6
1965	74,725	17,163	23.0
1966	106,900	24,400	22.8
1967	134,000	33,500	24.9
1968	162,800	41,900	25.7
1969	174,100	46,800	26.9
1970	204,200	58,200	28.5
1971	231,000	65,000	28.1
1972	302,000	92,100	29.5
1973	519,430	91,060	17.5
1974	731,752	124,920	16.4
1975	1,002,967	272,640	16.6
1976	2,310,254	475,959	20.6
1977	3,155,614	566,877	18.0
1978	3,530,061	561,066	15.9

NOTE: One dollar equalled approximately 67 rials in 1971 and 71 rials in 1978.

SOURCE: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1957, 1958, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1976 and 1978.

the same period, the national budget increased only 24 times. It is interesting to note that the defense establishment had enjoyed a bigger share (25.9%) of the budget in the period after the Shah's proclamation of his "White Revolution" in 1963 up to 1972 than in the preceding period from 1954 to 1963 (23.7%). (Please see Table 1 next page for the Iranian defense budget from 1954 to 1978.) The allocation for defense and security as a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) had also increased from 3.3 percent in 1961 to the relatively high figure of 8 percent in 1970. However, "the great increase in oil revenues since 1973 and the massive purchase of arms by the Iranian government had substantially changed these figures and ratios." The defense expenditure as a percentage of the GNP was 14 percent in 1974-75 but it rose to over 27 percent in 1975-76. From the aforesited Table 1, it can be seen that the defense budget had averaged 18.3 percent of the national budget for the period from 1973 to 1978. In U.S. dollars, the Iranian defense budget increased from \$880 million in 1970 to \$9.4 billion in 1977, almost an 1100% increase in seven years. (18)

Where did all this money go? Part of it went to the salaries, allowances and other administrative needs of the armed forces personnel. But a big slice of it went to the massive arms and military equipment procurement program of the Shah. He bought arms and equipment from the U.S., U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France, Germany

middlemen, five-percenters and influence-peddlers in its dealings with American companies." In mid-1978, he signed a decree to ensure "the ethical conduct of the Imperial Family." However, all this was an exercise in futility. For by that time, corruption in Iran was "so massive as to add significantly to the opposition." (15)

Economic Hardships and Excessive Military Expenditure

At the start of 1978, despite the Shah's "White Revolution," it was obvious that he had failed to deal with the serious socio-economic problems facing Iran. Inflation was very high. Many construction programs had been stopped. The agricultural sector had degenerated. The industrialization program, which had attracted the rural people to go to the cities, had failed to satisfy their expectations just as it had failed to meet its target. Imports had increased. Although the per capita income had increased from \$174.00 in 1963 to \$2,540.00 in 1978, (16) the gap between the few rich and the many poor had become much bigger. The economic hardships were just too much for most of the people. (17) Given this situation, the large defense spending was therefore a natural target for criticism.

The defense budget had increased over 36 times from 2,544 million rials in 1954 (immediately after the ouster of Mossadegh) to 92,100 million rials in 1972, while for

uninvolved Iranian middlemen, we insisted that the company pay that amount to the government. They did so in the form of spare parts. (13)

The third case was about the irregular sale of Bell helicopters to Iran in the early 1970's. In its report to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the U.S. Senate in February 1978, the staff that was directed to conduct the investigation submitted several pieces of evidence showing some anomaly in the sale of 489 Bell helicopters to Iran. It was pointed out that Bell Helicopter Company, considered as the "largest single American employer in Iran" at the time, paid \$2.9 million to Air Taxi, an Iranian air charter firm, as agent's fee for having facilitated the sale of 489 helicopters. Air Taxi was owned by General Mohammed Khatami, commander-in-chief of the Imperial Iranian Air Force, and some unidentified members of the royal family. Sale of helicopters was "heavily dependent on high-level contacts," so Bell Company was forced to hire Air Taxi as its agent. Besides, General Khatami was seen as very influential over aviation matters and so international business representatives in Iran were afraid to disappoint him. A witness even testified that the general had him expelled from Iran in 1966 as a result of a misunderstanding over a sales franchise. (14)

It may be noted that the Shah did indeed have a campaign against corruption. In 1975, he ordered that "the Government of Iran would not tolerate the activities of

Emirate of Dubai aboard navy ships, had become a general scandal." (11)

The second case had something to do with the sale by Grumman Corporation of F-14's to Iran. In August and September 1976, the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate conducted hearings on the recent Grumman sale of F-14 aircraft to Iran. In the course of the hearing, it was revealed to the body that key military officers and members of the Shah's family participated in the transaction and received payment for such participation. The names of General Toufanian, the Vice Minister of War at the time, General Khatami, the commander-in-chief of the Imperial Iranian Air Force, retired Colonel Assari, and Mr. Hussein Fouladi, whose wife was a member of the royal family, were prominently mentioned. Colonel Assari was named as the "conduit" through which millions of dollars were passed to Generals Toufanian and Khatami, the Fouladis, and several other unnamed military generals and colonels to make sure that Iran would buy the F-14's. (12) The Shah's version of the case only serves to support the contention that corruption in the armed forces did exist:

Although corruption exists everywhere, we went to great lengths to free our government from it. On at least two occasions, I personally intervened and told foreign suppliers that we would not tolerate their practices. One involved a telecommunications contract A second incident involved an order of 80 F-14 airplanes from Grumman Corporation. When we learned that Grumman planned to pay \$28 million to two

community against its security, and working in general for the overthrow of the Islamic order." (9) However, to be specific about it, the discussion in this paper is concerned only with "embezzlement and usurpation of public wealth."

Corruption in Iran's bureaucracy was public knowledge not only to the Iranians but also to the foreign nationals who had to deal with the government. This corruption "reached into the highest levels of government and indeed into the precincts of the imperial family itself." The armed forces officers were no exception; corruption in the armed forces was believed "common and codoned" since "commissions of 10% on arms sales regularly went to generals, ministers and others in the Shah's court and government." (10) In this paper, three specific cases are discussed to show large-scale corrupt practices in the armed forces.

In 1976, Admiral Ramzi Attai, the navy commander-in-chief, and ten other high-ranking officers were found guilty, by a military tribunal, of embezzling \$25 million, and they consequently got a sentence of five-year imprisonment and \$3.7 million fine. During the trial, Attai's wife was so indiscreet that she came to court wearing a diamond worth over \$1 million. Some observers insist that the Shah was forced to prosecute Attai and his officers only because their "activities, which included transporting duty-free luxury goods from the

than Iran." The Shah himself admitted in 1980 that his agents "tortured and executed political opponents." (6)

As a result of these violations of human rights, the people so hated the Shah and the armed forces, particularly the SAVAK, that the manifesto issued on 11 December 1978 at the conclusion of one of the biggest demonstrations in Tehran against the Shah called for "the overthrow and removal of the Shah's apparatus," because the Iranians believed that as long as the apparatus like the SAVAK existed, the people would lack basic human rights. (7) It was also this hatred which would explain why some of the first persons to be executed by the Islamic Republic of Iran were those connected with the SAVAK, including Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Iran's Prime Minister from January 1965 to August 1977, who was executed for his failure in the "supervision of the activities of the security police SAVAK, which was an appendage of the Prime Minister's office." (8)

Corruption

According to Ayatollah Khomeini, one of the major sins which the Shah and his associates committed during his reign was "corruption on earth." This is a broad term which includes "not only moral corruption, but also subversion of the public good, embezzlement and usurpation of public wealth, conspiring with the enemies of the

CHART 2

TRAINING PROGRAM FOR LITERACY WORKERS

SUBJECTS	NUMBER	TOTAL	
		PER CENT	TIME
A. EDUCATIONAL SUBJECTS			
1. The White Revolution	1	10	
2. Teaching Religion	1	10	
3. Teaching Persian	1	10	
4. Teaching Arithmetic	2	20	
5. Teaching Science and Social Studies	1	10	
6. Primary Education and Psychology	1	10	
7. Duties of Literacy Committees	1	10	
8. Teaching Scouting	3	30	
9. Arts and Rural Crafts	1	10	
10. National Anthem and Children's Songs	1	10	
B. SUPPLEMENTARY SUBJECTS			
1. Sociology (Rural Economics, Community Development and Cooperatives)	2	20	
2. Rural Sanitation	2	20	
3. Agricultural Extension	1	10	
4. House of Justice and Village Law	1	10	

SOURCE: Nancour Belagh, "An Analysis of the Educational Consequences of the 'White Revolution' in Iran" (1975), p. 400.

The Literacy Corpsmen soon found themselves teaching the children and the adults of the villages the three R's and many more subjects such as religion and ethics, Iranian language and literature, experimental sciences and hygiene, social instruction, arts and handcrafts, and physical education. (Please see Table 4 next page for the elementary school curriculum adopted in the late 1960's under the Shah's educational reforms.) But more than giving the people basic education, the Corpsmen were the only government representatives in the villages. They distributed books, gave lectures, showed films, and gave advices about a variety of basic subjects such as agricultural techniques, care of livestock and poultry, public sanitation, village law and community development, and medical problems. They encouraged the spirit of cooperation in the villages and active involvement in local social affairs, and they participated in such activities as constructing roads, schools, public bathrooms, clinics, bridges, mosques, water canals, slaughter houses, funeral homes and other community buildings. (38)

From several indications, it would seem that the Literacy Corps was a success. As a matter of fact, most of those who examined it have said so. Even the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at one time looked at it as a model. (39) And the Shah was very proud of it:

The results were spectacular: the number of

TABLE 4
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CURRICULUM
UNDER THE SHAH'S EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

SUBJECTS	GRADE					CUMULATIVE HOURS
	I	II	III	IV	V	
1. Religion and Ethics	2	2	3	3	3	13
2. Iranian Language and Literature . . .	12	12	9	9	8	50
3. Arithmetic and Geometry	3	3	4	4	5	19
4. Experimental Sciences and Hygiene	2	2	3	3	3	13
5. Social Instruction	2	2	3	3	3	13
6. Art and Handcrafts	5	5	4	4	4	22
7. Physical Education	2	2	2	2	2	10
TOTAL	28	28	28	28	28	140

NOTE: a. The length of the school day was five hours with a six-day school week.

b. The teaching day included three hours before noon and two hours in the afternoon.

c. Every Thursday afternoon was devoted to extra-curricular educational activities.

SOURCE: Mansour Delagah, "An Analysis of the Educational Consequences of the 'White Revolution' in Iran" (1975), p. 327.

pupils in Literacy Corps schools increased by 692 percent in fifteen years. During the first five years alone, 510,000 boys, 128,000 girls, 250,000 men and 12,000 women attended classes organized in the villages By 1978 more than 100,000 had served in the Literacy Corps The total number of Iranian students increased from 1.5 million in 1963 to more than 10 million in 1978. Credit for this achievement belongs largely to the Literacy Corps, which did more than just instruct. It instilled a thirst for knowledge. (40)

The Literacy Corps was so successful particularly in its initial stages that a writer made the following premature statement:

After they have been given four months' intensive training, the Cadets go out into country districts to teach. They thus present the Army, whose uniform they wear, in a new role, as the people's educator, co-operating with the nation in its enlargement of outlook and mastery of modern ways of living. There is evidence of the scheme's success. It is financed by the funds set aside for development and is perhaps one of the best devices so far resorted to for the prevention of revolution. (41)

If the Literacy Corps was good for Iran, why was it used by Khomeini as an issue against the Shah? The first reason has already been given: it was the feeling of the clergymen that what was being taught was Western in nature, while "their attitude toward all aspects of education was strongly, even violently, anti-Western." I believe that the second reason is the real one: the members of the clergy thought, as they do now, that the Shah was bent on removing their influence not only on the education of the Iranians but also on the other Iranian affairs. This fear was reinforced when they saw a line in a government

textbook stating that "it is to the benefit of the nation to root out the influence of the religious leaders." Considering that education was traditionally their "special province," Khomeini and the clergy could not accept any change that would diminish their influence. As noted by one knowledgeable observer, the Shah wanted to push them "back into the areas of faith and morals that he had reserved for them. The ulema themselves never accepted this, contending that Islam was a religion that concerned itself with all aspects of human existence, well beyond the limits of religiosity." (42)

Analysis

There is no doubt that the four factors mentioned above - brutality and other violations of human rights, corruption, economic hardships and excessive military expenditure, and cultural dislocation - were major causes of the Iranian revolution. These causes have always been mentioned in most books, papers, reports, articles and interviews about Iran. However, it would be relevant to ask whether their mere presence alone, without considering the other factors like the influence of Khomeini, could have launched the revolution. I doubt it very much, because without Khomeini there would have been no revolution. But without these causes, Khomeini and his supporters would not have had the ammunition to fire at the

Shah. These factors were therefore interrelated with each other.

As can be seen from the discussions in this chapter, there is no doubt also that the armed forces were somehow involved in all of the aforesaid four causes. But the question that has to be resolved is whether the armed forces can be blamed for these causes and, if so, to what extent.

In the case of brutality and other violations of human rights, there is no evidence that the Shah or any of his Prime Ministers had directed the armed forces to commit these inhuman acts. As a matter of fact, when pressured by the United States and the international organizations like the Amnesty International and the Red Cross, the Shah immediately attempted to improve the situation. (43) The armed forces personnel must have committed these acts of their own accord and initiative, perhaps either because of their misinterpretation of the signals coming from the Shah or because of their desire to ingratiate themselves to the Shah and thus perpetuate themselves in power.

It may be argued that, on the basis of history, the use of force was extremely necessary in controlling Iran since it was the only language that the Iranians understood. I do not subscribe to this kind of reasoning, for it would be the same as saying that since all countries, including the United States, have experienced the use of force in their development as nations, then they

have to continue using force even in this modern era. It would be as good as saying also that because of his history, man cannot rise above the level of the brute. Therefore, the pertinent question to ask is whether the armed forces personnel could have avoided the brutality and other violations of human rights if they wanted to do so. The answer is in the affirmative and so, for this reason, the armed forces must be blamed for their contribution to this particular cause of the revolution.

The same is true with corruption. The armed forces personnel could have avoided corruption if they wanted to do so; they could even have led the way in combatting it. But these things would have been difficult to do considering that corruption had already pervaded the whole Iranian bureaucracy and even most of the society itself. Nevertheless, this difficulty would not be a valid excuse, and so the armed forces must also answer for their involvement in this specific cause of the revolution.

How about excessive military expenditure? On this particular aspect, the Shah himself took a direct hand. No armed forces would refuse a government offer to spend so much for national defense and security, and the Iranian armed forces were no exception. However, if the key armed forces officers were really loyal to the Shah, they could have advised him what was good for the country. They could have told him to balance the different conflicting needs of Iran. And the story of the revolution would have been

different, granting that the Shah would listen. It was this fault that the armed forces would have to be responsible for. But the Shah would have to assume most of the blame.

In the case of cultural dislocation, it appears that the armed forces personnel only did what they thought was a lofty mission and they accomplished the mission well. It just so happened that the interest of the clergy was trampled upon in the process. The fault of the armed forces, therefore, was that they failed to accurately determine how much damage the Literacy Corps program had done to the clergy and how effective the clergy was in hitting back at the regime, and then to take whatever corrective action was necessary. But as to their contribution to cultural dislocation, the armed forces could only be indirectly responsible for it since they had no control over it.

Chapter V End Notes

1. Mahmood Poursaie, "Conditions for Revolution: The Case of Iran" (1981), p. 281.
2. Please refer to Chapter II.
3. Ayatollah Khomeyni, "Selected Articles and Interviews" (1977), p. 29. Most authors about Iran have the same impression although couched in mild words. In an interview, Major Dean Smith, U.S. Army, who was assigned in Iran from 1975 to 1977, has confirmed that the SAVAK's role as a brutal and coercive force was an accepted fact in Iran.
4. Amnesty International, "Report on Political Prisoners in Iran" (1976); Alfred Atherton, "Iran: Reform and Human Rights" (1976); Baltimore Sun, 31 October 1978, p. 2; Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Cannibals (1977); Facts on File Yearbook, Volume XL, 1980, p. 47; Robert Irani, "The Iranian Revolution" (1980); Iranian Students Association in the United States, "Report on the Violation of Human Rights in Iran" (1976); Ali-Reza Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts (1978), pp. 52-68 and 141-179; Sunday Times of London, 19 January 1975; Time (U.S.A.), 13 November 1978, p. 7; and U.S. House of Representatives, "Human Rights in Iran" (1976 and 1977).
5. Ibid.
6. Amnesty International, ibid.; Atherton, ibid., p. 6; Facts on File Yearbook, ibid. and Time (U.S.A.), 18 September 1978, p. 24.
7. Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 9. Text of the manifesto called "A Declaration of Independence" can be found in Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, pp. 233-235.
8. Interview of Hamid Algar with Ayatullah Khalkhali in Qum on 21 December 1979; see Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981), p. 310, n. 34. See also The Times Journal (Manila), 17 February 1979.
9. Ruhullah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981), p. 154, n. 43.
10. Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution (1981), p. 172;

William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (1981), p. 67; Time (U.S.A.), 27 November 1978, p. 23, and 18 September 1978, p. 24, and U.S. Senate, "Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy," Part 17 (1977), pp. 4 and 11. Maj. Dean Smith, in an interview, has confirmed the fact that corruption in the Iranian bureaucracy and the armed forces was a public knowledge in Iran.

11. Time (U.S.A.), 27 November 1978, p. 23; see also Eric Rouleau, "The Shah's Dream of Glory," in Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts (1978), p. 82.
12. U.S. Senate, "Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy," Part 17 (1977).
13. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (1980), p. 127.
14. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 28; and U.S. Senate, "Staff Investigation Relating to the Nomination of G. William Miller" (1978).
15. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, p. 172; Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 127; and U.S. Senate, "Multinational Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy," Part 12 (1976), p. 1138.
16. These particular figures are taken from Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 176.
17. Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (1978); Irani, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79" (1980), pp. 5 and 8; Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, p. 14; Poursandzie, "Conditions for Revolution: The Case of Iran" (1981), pp. 50-88; Quarterly Economic Review of Iran (1st Quarter, 1978), p. 1; Ann Radwan, "Iraq-Iran and the Gulf" (1982), p. 11; Amin Saikal, The Rise and Fall of the Shah (1980); Harold Saunders, "The Middle East 1978-79" (1979), p. 4; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 64-72; and World Bank, "A Study of the Agricultural Development of Iran" (1974).
18. Farhad Kazemi, "The Military and Politics in Iran," in Elie Kedouri and Sylvia Haim, eds., Towards a Modern Iran (1980), pp. 233-235; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, "Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security," 26th Session, 12 November 1971, p. 57; and U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran" (1976), p. 13.

19. Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 132, and Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 81.
20. U.S. General Accounting Office, "Financial and Legal Implications of Iran's Cancellation of Arms Purchase Agreements" (1979), and U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran" (1976), pp. iii and vii.
21. Time (U.S.A.), 4 November 1974, pp. 34-35.
22. U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran," p. vii.
23. Ibid., pp. 8-12; Khosrow Aryanpur Kashani, "American Arms Sales to Iran" (1977), pp. 69-87; and Rouleau, "The Shah's Dream of Glory," in Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts, p. 85.
24. Cyrus Vance, "Sale of Arms to Iran" (1977). See also Vance, "Proposed Sale of AWACS to Iran" (1977); and Philip Habib, "Sale of F-16's to Iran" (1976).
25. Khomeyni, "Khomeyni Interview on Islamic Revolutionary Movement" (1979), p. 13.
26. Irani, "The Iranian Revolution," p. 9; Nikki Keddie, Iran (1980), p. 177; and Time (U.S.A.), 18 September 1978, p. 22.
27. Khomeyni, "Selected Articles and Interviews" (1977), p. 21.
28. Abol-Hassan Banisadr, "Instead of the Shah, An Islamic Republic," in Nobari, ed., Iran Erupts (1978), p. 2.
29. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 81; and U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran," p. viii.
30. Sullivan, Ibid. p. 81. See also Keddie, Iran, pp. 176-177.
31. These are terms used in U.S. Senate, "U.S. Military Sales to Iran."
32. William Hickman, "Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army, 1982," p. 3. See also Time, 18 September 1978, p. 23.
33. Pahlavi, The White Revolution (1967), pp. 103-125; Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran

(1971), pp. 202-205; Mansour Delagah, "An Analysis of the Educational Consequences of the 'White Revolution' in Iran" (1975), pp. 195-320; Bahram Nouyan, "A Description of Education and Health Services in Iran" (1975), pp. 36-88; Massoud Khoddami, "Student Involvement in Decision-Making Processes in Iran" (1977), pp. 1-3; Kamal Argheydi, "The Role of Value Systems in the Process of Social Change: The Shah-People Revolution of Iran" (1978), pp. 144-174; Fereydon Hosseini-Fouladi, "A Study of Educational Policy Formulation in Iran" (1979), pp. 43-54; and Houshang Farivar, "A Descriptive Survey of the Status of Teacher-Education Programs in Iran" (1980), p. 54-62.

34. Khomeyni, Islamic Government (1979), p. 5; Khomeyni, "Khomeyni Interview on Islamic Revolutionary Movement" (1979), p. 12; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (1981), p. 296.

35. Khomeyni, Islamic Government, p. 63; and Khomeini interview with Time, 7 January 1980, p. 27.

36. Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, p. 202. For the text of the laws establishing the Literacy Corps, see Delagah, "An Analysis of the Educational Consequences of the 'White Revolution' in Iran," pp. 299-309.

37. Delagah, ibid., pp. 296-306. Prior to January 1968, the period of training was four months but since then this period had been extended to six months. Since October 1968, the period of educational service in the villages had been increased from fourteen months to eighteen months.

38. ibid., pp. 304 and 327; and Iranian Ministry of Information, Iran, p. 202.

39. Delagah, "An Analysis of the Educational Consequences of the 'White Revolution' in Iran," pp. 305-306; and Poursardie, "Conditions for Revolution," p. 281. See also the statement of Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House International Relations Committee (Atherton, "Iran: Reform and Human Rights" (1976), p. 2.)

40. Pahlavi, Answer to History (1980), pp. 113-114.

41. Peter Avery, Modern Iran (1965), p. 496.

42. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 186; Jack Miklos, The Iranian Revolution and Modernization, p. 24; and Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 90.
43. The Shah believed that it was this reaction of his to the said pressures that emboldened his enemies to surface and openly fight him. See Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp. 149-153. Many writers I have come across with share the same belief.

CHAPTER VI

THE ARMED FORCES DURING THE REVOLUTION

The behavior of the armed forces during a revolution is no doubt crucial to the success of that revolution. (1) This chapter therefore examines the actions and reactions of the Iranian armed forces during the Iranian revolution. Specifically, the chapter attempts to answer the question whether, when the demonstrations and riots were staged, the armed forces managed the situation properly or they did something instead that worsened the situation. The chapter also attempts to answer the related question why, when the period of final confrontation came, the armed forces fell to pieces after a mere three days of minor street fighting.

For convenience rather than for anything else, this paper divides the Iranian revolution into four phases, namely:

Phase 1.- From the start of the revolution in January 1978 up to 27 August 1978 when the government of Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar collapsed;

Phase 2.- From 27 August 1978 to 5 November 1978,

readiness to take a holiday once Bakhtiar's government had been confirmed by the parliament. (32)

By this time, it was obvious that the morale of the armed forces personnel was very low. The troops had been in the streets for nearly four months. Violence continued. Many of the demonstrators confronting the soldiers were their own sons, brothers and relatives. The young officers in many Iranian units were in confusion and despair. A significant number of senior officers were in close touch with opposition leaders. Into this situation came General Robert Huyser, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces in Europe, who arrived in Iran on 3 January 1979. (33)

Huyser's mission in Iran was not clear. According to State Secretary Vance, Huyser was in Iran to urge the Iranian military "to support the civilian government in coping with the problems which Iran faces." Huyser told Ambassador Sullivan that his task was "to meet with the senior officers of the Iranian military command in order to assure them of the continuity of American logistical support and to urge them to maintain the integrity of their forces in the difficult period that would accompany the departure of the Shah and the investiture of the Bakhtiar government ... (and) to assist the military in the difficult psychological task of abandoning their traditional oath to the Shah and transferring their loyalties to the civilian authority of the Prime Minister,

cardiac attack. The hopelessness of the situation can be summarized by what Azhari told Ambassador Sullivan in his sickbed on 22 December: "This country is lost because the king cannot make up his mind." (30)

Because of Azhari's poor health, the worsening situation in Iran, the Shah's desire to form a coalition with the opposition, and pressures from the United States, the Shah started looking for somebody, even from the opposition, to form a civilian government. He was willing to negotiate everything except his control over the armed forces and the military budget. However, looking for the right person was not an easy thing to do. For, as observed by Khomeini, "everywhere the goal is the same: an Islamic government." Besides, as described by Abol-Hassan Banisadr, who later became President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, "the winning over of the opposition to a compromise solution would only make the present dilemma more acute." (31)

The Shah, "with some reluctance and under foreign pressure," finally settled on Dr. Shahpur Bakhtiar, the deputy chief of the opposition National Front. The decision was made after Bakhtiar expressed his loyalty to the constitution and the monarchy, which made him different from the other opposition leaders whom the Shah had talked to. So on 29 December, Bakhtiar was asked to form a civilian government. On 2 January 1979, the Shah, in his first public appearance in two months, announced his

Then came December and with it the "Ashura," two successive Shi'a days of religious mourning wherein the "faithful usually display their piety by acts of public flagellation and processions honoring the martyrs of Shi'a history." On each day, one million people joined the religious procession which turned out to be peaceful on account of the efficient leadership of the organizers and the absence of the military and the police who had agreed to stay away from the routes of march. On one of these days, 11 December, it was reported that three conscripts from the Imperial Guards, one of whom allegedly had a brother killed in an earlier demonstration, shot to death several officers in Lavizan military base in Tehran. On the same day also, an "Amnesty International report" was released accusing Iran of "continuing systematically to torture political prisoners despite assurances from the Shah that torture had ceased." (29)

The initial success of the military government did not last long. Soon after the "Ashura," the strikes resumed, particularly in the oil industry, airline service, banks, power plants, and government offices. Demonstrations and riots broke out again. In Tabriz, it was reported that a number of soldiers with tanks and trucks went over to the side of the demonstrators who wildly cheered them. The crisis and the burden of responsibility must have been too much for Azhari because, less than two months after assuming office, he suffered a

government was the ultimate solution to the chaotic situation in Iran and the Shah's last chance for survival. But to Khomeini, it was "usurpatory and contrary to both the law of the land and the sharia" and should therefore be opposed in any way. (26)

Azhari initially filled his government with generals. But within a few days, he was able to get civilians to his Cabinet and only two portfolios remained to be held by military officers, namely: Gen. Qharabaghi, who was Minister of the Interior, Economic Affairs and Finance; and Gen. Oveischi, who was Minister of Labor and Social Affairs. His immediate action was to restore order in the country and to improve the production of oil which had fallen very low. He gave in to some opposition demands, like arresting some officials including former Prime Minister Hoveyda and former SAVAK head Gen. Nassiri. For a while, at least during the month of November, Azhari appeared to have made some progress. (27)

In the meantime, the Shah began contacting prominent civilians, including leaders of the opposition. He was able to talk with former Prime Minister Ali Amini and opposition leaders like Mr. Sadighi, Mr. Sanjabi and Mr. Bazargan. Amini accepted the Shah's request for him to go to Paris to offer a compromise to Khomeini, but he came back with the information that nothing but the Shah's abdication would satisfy Khomeini and his group. The other opposition leaders wanted the Shah to leave Iran. (28)

Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Daily (NID) "reported indications of morale problems in the military, but generally stressed the capacity of the Shah and of the Iranian army to handle the situation." It can be said that this kind of optimism led U.S. officials like President Carter and State Secretary Vance to publicly declare support for the Shah. Of course, as later discovered by a congressional study, the basis of their enthusiasm was faulty. (24)

In the morning of 4 November, arsonists swept through the city and burned several buildings, mostly banks, movie houses and liquor stores. The British Chancery was included. By late afternoon, buildings were still in flame. It should be noted that because of the government's failure to prevent the burning of the city, the SAVAK was again suspected by the people as the perpetrator of the crime. Anyway, faced with this situation, believing that martial law was not strictly enforced, and assured of the support of the U.S., the Shah relieved Emami from his position and installed a military government effective 6 November. The government was now under General Gholam Reza Azhari, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces. (25)

Phase 3 (General Azhari's Military Government)

To some persons, General Azhari's military

Despite martial law, violence continued to spread throughout the country. Demonstrations and riots were daily occurrences. A wave of strikes not only in industries but now also in the civil service almost paralyzed the whole nation. The opposition forces became much bolder. It was obvious that Emami's plan of action was a failure. Such failure was expected by the opposition who believed that Emami had been "implicated in the past in all corrupt affairs and is in no way authorized to speak of respect for the law." (22)

During this period, the demonstrators began applying the "tactics of fraternization with the soldiers" and young girls were seen placing flowers in the muzzles of the soldiers' guns. They also began to use slogans directed against the Shah, particularly the slogan "Death to the Shah!" Some of their slogans were directed to the armed forces, like "Soldier-brothers, don't kill brothers" and "Oh Army, you are ours!" On the other hand, the military was still trying to develop anti-riot tactics and to secure additional equipment and training from the U.S. and the United Kingdom. In the meantime, some soldiers were quick to use their guns at the slightest provocation despite orders to refrain from firing at demonstrators, while at least one soldier was reported to have refused to fire at the demonstrators and instead committed suicide after shooting his commander. (23)

It was also during this period when the U.S.

This declaration of martial law came at a time when a demonstration was to be held on the same day at Jaleh Square in front of the parliament building in commemoration of the death of "martyrs" in previous rioting in Qum. As it turned out, the demonstrators did gather there but the troops were also there to disperse them. A confrontation occurred and the rest of the story has been told in different conflicting versions. Anyway, regardless as to whoever started it, a melee ensued and the soldiers fired into the crowd. Almost a hundred demonstrators were killed and thousands were injured. This day later became known as "Black Friday." (20)

On 10 September, Emami imposed martial law in eleven other cities, the first time it was done in nearly a quarter of a century. The Shah said that this martial law was to last only for six months and "in the meantime, all aspects of freedom, free speech and everything will be absolutely carried out." The Shah's inconsistency in dealing with the situation resulted in a misunderstanding between the Prime Minister and the military led by General Oveisssi who was the commander of the Iranian Ground Forces and martial-law administrator. Oveisssi complained that he could not effectively administer martial law in "circumstances of such political leniency." Nevertheless, the military deployed forces to all major cities and arrested several leaders of the opposition including some ayatollahs. (21)

which took the major streets for its route was participated in by more than one hundred thousand Iranians. But what alarmed the government more was the efficiency with which this march was organized and controlled, because it showed the unity of the opposition. (17)

Khomeini did not let this opportunity pass without giving a word to the armed forces. After this successful event, he sent the following message to the soldiers:

I thank the Iranian army for not opening fire on the huge marches that took place in Tehran and the provinces - marches of patriotic people enraged by fifty years of oppressive rule by the Pahlavi dynasty ... At this critical juncture, when our country stands on the edge of a precipice and is confronted with the choice of either total collapse or genuine independence, I extend my hand to all those in the army, air force and navy who are faithful to Islam and the homeland and ask them to assist us in preserving our independence and emerging from the yoke of slavery and humiliation ... Proud soldiers who are ready to sacrifice yourself for your country and homeland, arise! Suffer slavery and humiliation no longer! Renew your bonds with the beloved people and refuse to go on slaughtering your children and brothers for the sake of the whims of this family of bandits! (18)

On 8 September, the government imposed martial law in Tehran. According to the Shah, Emami had to do this because street rioting continued and had reached such proportion that required the imposition of martial law. However, according to Ambassador Sullivan, this martial law was a reaction to the awesome demonstration on the previous day and was a decision reached by the Shah and his military commanders in a long meeting held at the palace that night. (19)

even if they fire on you and kill you." This would mean not to hurt or antagonize the soldiers but to fight them with love. (14)

It was also during this period when signs of discontent among the armed forces personnel began to appear. Some technicians, particularly the air force homofars, complained about salary benefits and conditions of enlistment. (15)

Phase 2 (Prime Minister Emami's Government)

When Sharif Emami took over the position of Prime Minister on 27 August, it was with the understanding that he would be operating independently of the Shah. His plan of action was to give massive concessions to the opposition, like lifting censorship of the press, permitting broadcast of debates from the parliament, and allowing all political activity free of government constraint. Ambassador Sullivan has labeled this program "feeding the crocodiles," to emphasize the dangers attendant to the program. (16)

The new Prime Minister's first test in office came in the first week of September. To mark the end of "Ramadan," a demonstration in Tehran on 7 September was planned by the clergy. To the surprise of the Shah and his civilian and military advisers, who had decided to allow the religious procession to be held, the demonstration

Minister Jamshid Amuzegar with Sharif Emami, who had been Prime Minister twenty years before. (10)

Several significant developments emerged during Phase 1. At the height of the demonstrations, Iran still had to order tear gas from the United States, an indication that it was not prepared for these incidents. To make matters worse, the procurement of this much-needed anti-riot weapon was delayed due to some technicalities in the U.S. Department of State whose officials thought that tear gas was a lethal police weapon and therefore a controlled item. (11)

After a few skirmishes with the armed forces, the people's fear of the Shah's armed machinery began to disappear. They no longer considered the armed forces invincible. (12)

During this period also, the Shah again displayed his indecisiveness. He was not sure which way to go: whether to tighten or continue loosening control. Also apparent was the lack of accurate intelligence which the Shah greatly needed as a basis for making critical decisions. Moreover, the government began to lose in the propaganda war, as shown in the aftermath of the Abadan fire. (13)

Another significant development was Khomeini's advice to his followers in dealing with the armed forces. His message was: "Do not attack the army in its breast, but in its heart ... You must appeal to the soldiers' hearts

to occur. The Shah's reaction was to look for scapegoats and he found them in the SAVAK. He relieved some officers of the SAVAK, including its long-time head General Nassiri. (7)

On 5 August, Iran's Constitution Day and the start of "Ramadan" or period of fasting, the Shah announced that free elections would take place in the spring of 1979 and he reaffirmed his commitment to liberalization. By this time, the Shah's opponents had seen that their demonstrations and strikes were effective. Their reaction to the Shah's pronouncements was therefore to hold more demonstrations and strikes. In Isfahan, movie houses, vehicles and bars were burned. The government could not tolerate this violent situation anymore so it imposed martial law in Isfahan on 11 August. (8)

An unfortunate incident happened in Abadan on 19 August. A movie house was burned, killing 477 persons. Failure of the government to solve the case caused the people to believe the propaganda of Khomeini and his group that it was the armed forces personnel, particularly elements of the police and the SAVAK, who set the theater on fire in order to make it appear that the Shah's opponents would do anything just to accomplish their objective. (9)

The Shah thought that in order "to save the country from chaos and destruction ... a new government might provide the answer," so on 27 August he replaced Prime

decrees on land reform and women's emancipation. However, the government over-reacted by sending armed troops, who were untrained for anti-riot duties, to disperse the demonstration. With only a slight provocation, the soldiers fired at the demonstrators. Believing that some agitators were hiding in the home of Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, the troops entered the ayatollah's home and shot the suspects in the presence of the religious leader whose plea for restraint was unheeded by the soldiers. This incident gave the clergy and the people their "martyrs" and marked the beginning of a series of violent demonstrations which ultimately led to the overthrow of the Shah. (5)

In accordance with the Shi'ite custom of mourning over their dead every forty days, several demonstrations were held in Tabriz, Qum, and Meshed on 17 February; in Yazd and many other cities, including Tehran, on 29 March; and in Qum, Tabriz, and Kazeroun on 11 May. These demonstrations, which Khomeini called the "referendum of the streets," turned out to be bloody confrontations between the demonstrators and the armed forces personnel, resulting in the death and injury of hundreds of persons. (6)

In mid-May, the students began to strike and the bazaars began to close. The link among students, merchants and clergy had now surfaced. In June, strikes in factories and industries, particularly those in the oil sector, began

American policy on human rights and the Shah's reaction to it, had reappeared and was becoming bolder. The causes of discontent, which eventually became the causes of the revolution, as discussed earlier, had been effectively exploited by Ayatollah Khomeini and the other opponents of the Shah in arousing the people's hatred toward the regime. (3) As reported in the U.S. State Department's Morning Summary for the period, "the Shah's Islamic opponents were in their strongest position since 1963." (4) The situation was unbearable for many people. What was needed was a mere spark to ignite the revolution.

Observers and researchers are unanimous in saying that the incident of 9 January 1978, wherein several demonstrators were killed by soldiers in the sacred city of Qum, was the spark that ignited the revolution. This incident started as a peaceful demonstration. Led by the clergy, the people took the streets for various reasons, namely: to protest the regime's violations of human rights, to highlight the inconsistency between the U.S. policy on human rights and President Carter's solicitous praise of the Shah given during his state visit to Tehran on 1 January 1978, to mourn over the mysterious death of Khomeini's son which the SAVAK was suspected of having perpetrated in the later part of 1977, to protest the recent publication of a defamatory article about Khomeini in the government-controlled press, and to dramatize their objection to the anniversary celebration of the Shah's

coinciding with the government of Prime Minister Jaafar Sharif-Emami;

Phase 3.- From 6 November 1978 when the military government of General Gholam Reza Azhari was installed up to 6 January 1979 when Shapur Bakhtiar assumed the premiership and formed a civilian government; and

Phase 4.- From 6 January 1979, coinciding with the premiership of Bakhtiar, up to 11 February 1979 when he officially resigned to give way to the Islamic Republic of Iran. (2)

The discussions in this chapter are therefore presented according to the aforesighted sequence of events.

Phase 1 (Prime Minister Amuzegar's Government)

Even before 1978, there had been demonstrations and riots in Iran. As already noted, the demonstrations and riots in 1963 were as violent as those in 1978. The period between 1963 and 1978, although seemingly peaceful, was pockmarked with intermittent disturbances. But Iran at those times was not yet ready for revolution.

In January 1978, 36 years after the Shah ascended the Peacock throne, Iran was ripe for a revolution. The economy was going down. Pressured by the United States, the Shah, who had been able to establish only a facade of stability for Iran, was slowly loosening control of the country. The opposition in Iran, encouraged by the

to whom they would be subordinate." According to the Shah, Huyser came "to neutralize the Iranian army" to prevent a military coup. But according to Khomeini, Huyser's mission was "to investigate the feasibility of a military coup d'etat aimed at destroying the revolution." (34)

On 4 January, Bakhtiar was officially named Prime Minister of Iran by the Shah. On 6 January, he presented to the Shah Iran's new civilian government. (35)

Phase 4 (Prime Minister Bakhtiar's Government)

Prime Minister Bakhtiar's program which he submitted to the Majlis (Parliament) on 11 January included the following: "the dissolution of the SAVAK; the gradual abolition of martial law; the punishment of violators of human rights; the release of, and payment of compensation to, political prisoners; a greater role for Moslem religious leaders in the drafting of government legislation; and the continuation of ties with Arab brothers." His Cabinet which the Majlis approved on 16 January was composed of virtually unknown men in the political circles and had only one military officer who was the War Minister. Bakhtiar originally selected Gen. Fereydun Djam as War Minister but had to replace Djam on 11 January with Gen. Ja'afar Shafaqat, a close aide of the Shah, because Djam wanted the armed forces to be responsible to him while Bakhtiar thought the Shah should

remain the supreme commander. (36)

At the time the Shah formally appointed Bakhtiar as Prime Minister on 4 January, he also appointed Gen. Qharabaghi as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to replace Gen. Azhari. A few days later, the Shah appointed Gen. Rahimi as Tehran's military commander and Gen. Abdel Ali Badrei as commander of the ground forces, both to replace Gen. Oveischi who had held these positions concurrently and who was reported to have left the country to avoid trial on a charge of transferring a large amount of money into a foreign bank account. (37)

Bakhtiar's acceptance of the premiership was immediately denounced by the opposition. Khomeini said that obedience to the Bakhtiar government was tantamount to "obedience to Satan" and he urged government employees to close their offices and refuse to obey the new ministers. The National Front, in expelling Bakhtiar, condemned his action as "opportunist" and "betrayal" of its cause. However, the most serious reaction came in the form of continued unrest, strikes, demonstrations and violence throughout the country. (38)

Yielding to pressures from all sides, including the United States, the Shah finally decided to leave Iran. Much to his surprise, the plan for the Shah's departure was announced in Washington on 11 January by State Secretary Vance. However, before leaving Iran, the Shah formed a nine-man regency council on 13 January under the

chairmanship of Mr. Tehrani, a former Cabinet member known to be loyal to the Shah, and having the following as members: Prime Minister Bakhtiar, Senate President Sajadi, Parliament Speaker Said, Minister to the Imperial Court Mr. Ardalan, Chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company Mr. Entezam, two former Cabinet ministers, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Gen. Qharabaghi. Not to be outdone, Khomeini also formed on the same day his own "revolutionary Islamic council" which would replace the "illegal government," and whose membership would be announced in due time. (39)

In the meantime, violent disturbances were reported occurring in several places. For example, in Shiraz on 11-12 January, immediately after martial law had been lifted there, the SAVAK premises and other buildings were burned by demonstrators who also killed four SAVAK officials in the process. In Masjid-i Sulayman on 14 January, six army cadets who attempted to join demonstrations against the Shah and Bakhtiar were shot to death by army regulars. (40)

On 16 January, shortly after Bakhtiar's Cabinet had been approved by the parliament, the Shah and Empress Farah left Tehran for Egypt, their children having flown to the United States the previous day. Hundreds of thousands gathered in the streets on this day "to celebrate the historic occasion and to demand the abolition of the monarchy." The Shah left Iran with hope that Bakhtiar

"will be able to make up for the past and also lay the foundations for the future," and with confidence that the armed forces personnel who were "tied to the Crown and the Constitution by an oath of loyalty" would not falter as long as the constitution was respected. (41)

On 18 January, Khomeini expressed his evaluation of the current state of the armed forces:

The Shah has exerted efforts to build the Iranian army in a special and tightly-knit way, thus paralyzing the ability of the military to take the initiative ... Outwardly, we see that the military are now in the ranks of those who defend the regime, but I am confident that deep inside they are not pleased with the government and the Shah cannot depend on their support forever. They have already begun to join the people and the revolution. (42)

After the Shah's departure, the armed forces appeared disoriented and confused. Although their leadership and Bakhtiar seemed to have gotten along well, there was a basic contradiction in the way both parties looked at the Iranian situation. Bakhtiar, encouraged by President Carter's adviser Brzezinski and Gen. Huyser, wanted to make preparations for the eventual confrontation between the military and the revolution, although expecting to use only a minimal military force to overcome the revolution. On the other hand, the military leadership wanted to avoid a confrontation as much as possible, and key officers like Gen. Qharabaghi, Chief of Staff, and Gen. Moghaddam, chief of SAVAK, were having meetings on this matter with opposition leaders like Mehdi Bazargan.

This basic difference led Qharabaghi to file his resignation but he was prevailed upon by Bakhtiar, with the assistance of Ambassador Sullivan, to change his mind. It is interesting to note that the armed forces did not have contingency plans for the tasks they might face. There were no reserves even of diesel oil and gasoline for their use. Occurrence of breakdown of discipline - units joining demonstrations, desertion, rampage, shooting at demonstrators, and the like - became more frequent. In the words of Ambassador Sullivan, "the military had convincingly lost its will . . . and the armed forces would, in a crunch, collapse." (43)

On 20 January, Khomeini announced that he would return to Iran on 26 January and urged Bakhtiar to step down. This announcement drew different reactions from various quarters. Bakhtiar said he would not resign. Gen. Qharabaghi pledged support for Bakhtiar but he continued negotiating with Bazargan. Bazargan said that the supporters of Khomeini would fight if the army tried to stop their leader from taking power upon arrival in Iran. Daily anti-government demonstrations grew more violent, while pro-Shah elements rampaged through the streets killing people and destroying property. (44)

The arrival of Khomeini was moved to 1 February. The official reason for postponement was the closure of the Iranian airports from 24 to 27 January due to strikes by air traffic controllers and employees of Iran Air.

However, the real reason could be Bakhtiar's desire to strike a compromise with Khomeini before the latter's arrival. Meanwhile, martial law was reimposed on 27 January after having been suspended for a month. (45)

Khomeini finally returned to Tehran on 1 February, aboard an Air France plane, and was given a tumultuous welcome at the Tehran airport. Around three million people gathered in Tehran to greet him. Relatedly, martial law regulations were lifted in Tehran from 1 to 4 February on condition that all assemblies were disciplined and peaceful. From the airport, Khomeini went to the Behesht Zahran Cemetery to pay his respects to the "martyrs" of past disturbances. On this occasion, several military men were seen joining the crowd and carrying pictures of Khomeini. (46)

Shortly after his arrival in Iran, Khomeini delivered two important statements. One was about Bakhtiar whose authority he refused to recognize:

This man Bakhtiar is accepted by no one. The people do not accept him, the army does not accept him, his friends do not accept him, he does not even accept himself. It is only America, which has sent an envoy to instruct the army to support him, and Britain that recognize him. (47)

The other statement of Khomeini was directed to the armed forces:

Members of the armed forces, Islam is better for you than unbelief, and our nation is better for you than the foreigners. It is for your sake, too, that we are demanding independence, so you should do your part by abandoning this man. Do

not think that if you do, we will slaughter you all ... Look at the humafars and officers who have joined us; they are treated with the utmost respect. We want our country to be powerful and to have strong armed forces. We do not wish to destroy our armed forces, we wish rather to preserve them so that they belong to the people and serve their interests, instead of being under the command and supervision of foreigners. (48)

These statements could be considered "finishing touches" to the successful termination of the revolution. For when Khomeini returned to Iran, the Pahlavi dynasty had already virtually collapsed. The armed forces, traumatized by their daily confrontations with the people in the streets, had begun to reconsider their position on the mounting Islamic revolution. Many personnel, mostly from the air force, had joined the people's marches in Tehran and in the provinces in support of the Shah. To make matters worse, the bureaucracy no longer functioned and many ad hoc organizations known as "Komitehs," headed by local clergymen, had emerged to take care of the needs of the people. (49)

On 5 February, Khomeini announced the appointment of Dr. Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister of a provisional Islamic government and he warned that anyone who disobeyed this government would be severely punished. Bakhtiar called this move "a joke" and vowed he would "not surrender to a mob." (50)

On 9 February, the three-day climax of the revolution began. It started when an armored unit of the Imperial Guards attacked the Doshen Toppeh Air Force Base

in Tehran to crush a mutiny of air force cadets and technicians who took up arms against the air force command to show their support for Khomeini. Fighting broke out and continued up to the night. As news of the fighting spread, thousands of people, mostly belonging to the Tudeh and the different guerilla organizations and armed with various weapons, rushed to the air force base to help the rebels. They set up barricades along all approaching streets. As the fighting went on, some of the soldiers of the Imperial Guards, together with their tanks, moved to the other side. There are several versions as to how long the fighting in the air force base lasted, but all agree that the responding Imperial Guards unit withdrew, and the rebels got hold of the weapons inside the base which they in turn distributed to the people. (51)

The air force rebellion emboldened the people more. They set up barricades throughout the city and called for the overthrow of the Bakhtiar government. Armed civilians and guerillas, joined by armed forces rebels and defectors, attacked military installations and police stations and seized the weapons kept therein. By the end of 10 February, the city had been flooded with weapons. However, Bakhtiar said in a broadcast that the fighting did not have any effect on him and that his government would act decisively to put an end to the disturbances. (52)

On 11 February, Sunday, successful attacks were mounted on the remaining installations. The barracks of

the Imperial Guards, the Evin prison which also served as the SAVAK interrogation center, the military academy, and the main headquarters of the Iranian armed forces fell with little or no resistance at all. In other parts of the country, similar events occurred, although few units were reported to have put up stiff resistance. At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Gen. Gharabaghi announced that the military would no longer take sides in the struggle between Bakhtiar and the revolutionary Islamic council, and consequently ordered all soldiers to return to their barracks. Then he sent a message to Bazargan that the armed forces were "prepared to recognize his provisional government." (53)

Bereft of support from the armed forces, Bakhtiar officially resigned his position as Prime Minister in the evening of 11 February in a meeting he had with Bazargan. The revolution was a success. (54)

Analysis

The following discernible patterns characterized the actions and reactions of the armed forces during the revolution:

1. Use of unnecessary force. - The armed forces were not trained nor prepared to handle violent demonstrations and riots. They were largely designed to assure security in the Gulf, particularly guarding against

Soviet inroads. At the height of the demonstrations, they were still developing anti-riot tactics and trying to secure equipment and training from the United States and other countries. Confronted by unarmed demonstrators, many of the soldiers without hesitation fired at the unruly crowd, even inside religious shrines. Thousands of people died in clashes with military troops. The SAVAK, for its part, continued to use its torture chambers. These incidents angered, and consequently emboldened, the Iranians.

2. Resort to "military half-measures." - On orders of the Shah, the armed forces implemented what can be called "half-measures." Curfew was implemented on and off. Assemblies of three or more persons were banned, then tolerated, banned again, allowed once more, and banned again. Martial law was declared, then relaxed, on again, relaxed once more, and reimposed again. These cases of indecisiveness moved the people to ask for more and more concessions and made them bolder and bolder each time. Such indecisiveness reflected weakness not only on the part of the Shah but the armed forces as well.

3. Loss of credibility. - As days went on, the armed forces were losing their credibility to maintain peace and order. For example, employees of major banks, which had been a frequent target of fire bombs and arson by anti-government demonstrators, walked out, demanding that they be given adequate security. The armed forces were

losing even in the propaganda war. The burning of the theater in Abadan in August 1978 and several buildings in Tehran in November of the same year could very well be the work of the leftists, but the people were made to believe by the Shah's enemies that the burning was done by the SAVAK.

4. Failure to "feel the pulse" of the people. - Obviously, the armed forces failed to correctly "feel the pulse" of the people and advise the Shah about it. The armed forces leadership was divided on this issue. There were hardliners who believed that the only way to maintain order was to enforce martial law strictly and evenly. But there were those who believed that the Shah should give in to the demands of the people. These readings came in too late to influence the situation.

5. Breakdown of discipline. - In the course of the revolution, the discipline of the troops broke down. Many soldiers, mostly conscripts, laid down their arms and joined the demonstrations. On the other hand, many regular troops not only joined but actually led "javid shah" (long live the Shah) rampages which were more violent than the people's demonstrations.

In the light of the foregoing observations, it is clear that during the revolution the Iranian armed forces mishandled the situation. Their actions and reactions actually exacerbated the situation.

Why did the armed forces easily fall to pieces

during the final three-day confrontation? I believe that even before this final confrontation, the armed forces had already lost their will to fight. The showdown only formalized their defeat. Without this will, the soldiers were simply overwhelmed by the people who came to confront them. There was nothing the armed forces could have done under the circumstances. In fact, when the White House asked the U.S. military advisory group commander in Tehran for his assessment of the possibilities of a military coup d'etat at the time when the main armed forces headquarters was besieged by the people, his answer was only five percent. (55)

Why then did the armed forces lose their will to fight? Several reasons for this development could be advanced:

1. The Shah himself - As earlier discussed, everything concerning the armed forces revolved around the Shah. So when he showed his indecisiveness at the height of the violent disturbances, the armed forces faltered with him. When he physically left the country, the armed forces lost their only rallying point and became disoriented. He certainly was not a leader in times of crisis.

2. Influence of Khomeini - Khomeini was a charismatic leader. Compared to the Shah, he was persistent and consistent. He did not accept any compromise. He was able to win the hearts and minds of the soldiers by paying particular attention to them not only

through his messages but also through the fraternization tactics which he told his followers to adopt towards the soldiers.

3. Influence of religion. - Shi'a Islam had so greatly affected the lives of the Iranians, including armed forces personnel, that it was in the mosques that they could find comfort in times of personal crisis. Through the sermons of the clergy, the soldiers got messages of Khomeini for them to join the revolution.

4. Influence of culture. - Among Iranians, the family was very important. So how could the soldiers be expected to shoot their own brothers, sisters or children who were in the streets confronting them, especially if some of these relatives were carrying flowers instead of guns?

5. Lack of preparation and training. - The soldiers were equipped and trained for a different role: to fight against external aggression. Deployed in the streets, some of them were quick to use their guns against demonstrators. As time went on, they were simply tired of killing their own countrymen.

6. Lack of ideals. - The first Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces under the Khomeini regime, Gen. Mohammad Vali Gharani, had this simple explanation for the sudden about-face by the military: "The army had no ideals. Its only mission was the defense of a single person, the Shah, and not of a country. That's why it was broken up so

quickly." Another observer has pointed out that to control the armed forces, there must be something that would keep the people and the armed forces united, like an imminent external threat. (56)

7. Questionable conduct of the armed forces leadership. - As earlier noted, the military leaders failed to give the Shah accurate intelligence and proper advice. They were divided on basic issues. When the Shah left, they were inconsistent by attempting to show their loyalty to Prime Minister Bakhtiar on one hand while at the same time negotiating with Khomeini's camp on the other hand. The fact that some of them were not arrested and executed by the revolutionary Islamic council would seem to indicate that by negotiating they were only trying to save their skin. In the case of Gen. Gharabaghi, the Shah believed that he was a traitor for having "used his authority to prevent military action against Khomeini." (57)

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Chapter VII End Notes

1. Apolonio Batalla, "Factor of Will," Bulletin Today (Manila), 5 February 1979, p. 6.

lose heart and segments of them move over to the other side. So it will be a question of will in the streets eventually, and the mobs have the advantage." (1) Such indeed was the case in Iran.

external aggressors but were not prepared to handle even minor demonstrations. It can be said that the Shah's dream of making Iran into a modern and developed nation was shattered by the gunfire of his soldiers.

4.5. The leader must be provided with accurate information as a basis for correct decisions. - The armed forces under-estimated Khomeini's strength and staying power. They also failed to get accurate "readings" of the people's sentiments.

4.6. The people can be "pushed to the wall" up to a certain extent only. - The brutalities and tortures employed by the armed forces, particularly the SAVAK, might have been intended to cow the people into submission. But these boomeranged. In the end, the people fought the government, knowing well the risk to their lives.

4.7. Loyalty of the armed forces must not be to the leader alone but to the country above all else. - The Iranian armed forces' loyalty to the Shah had been unquestionable from the start of the revolution onward, but when the hour of decision came, their personnel immediately gave up to the people's will.

4.8. No armed forces personnel can be expected to massacre hundreds of their countrymen in a direct confrontation. - As one observer correctly puts it, "The armed forces can be strongly determined to kill foreigners in a war. In a domestic conflict, where the contending force is civilian and virtually unarmed, the armed forces

4. The lessons that may be learned from what happened in Iran are:

4.1. It is not a sound policy for a leader to rely heavily on the backing of the armed forces without broadening the base of his support. - The Shah practically pampered the armed forces, to the extent of condoning corruption, but failed to mend fences with his powerful religious foes, to restrain his feared secret police, to halt corruption in high places, or to control his ambitions to rapidly convert Iran into a modern power.

4.2. National development must be balanced. - The modernization program of Iran was biased toward the military, to the detriment of the other sectors, and was implemented without regard to its adverse effects on Iranian culture.

4.3. In times of crisis, the leader must be decisive. - The Shah and the armed forces could have quashed the revolt during the initial stages through uncompromising enforcement of martial law, instead of opting for the so-called "military half-measures" which, because of wrong timing, were only interpreted as signs of weakness not only on the part of the Shah but of the armed forces as well.

4.4. The armed forces must be equipped and trained not only to fight against external aggression but to counter internal threats as well. - The Iranian armed forces personnel were equipped and trained to fight against

discipline. These actions and reactions actually exacerbated the situation.

When the final three-day confrontation came, the armed forces had already lost their will to fight and the showdown only formalized their defeat. The following reasons could be advanced for this development: the Shah himself, influence of Khomeini, influence of religion, influence of culture, lack of preparation and training, lack of ideals, and questionable conduct of the armed forces leadership.

Conclusion and Lessons Learned

In view of the foregoing findings, this study concludes that:

1. The Iranian armed forces contributed to the causes which led the people of Iran to rise against the Shah;
2. When the demonstrations and riots were staged, the armed forces did not manage the situation properly, and instead their actions and reactions actually worsened the situation;
3. When the period of final confrontation came, the armed forces fell to pieces after a mere three days of minor street fighting because even before that period they had already lost their will to fight and the showdown only formalized their defeat; and

final confrontation came, why did the armed forces fall to pieces after a mere three days of minor street fighting? Relatedly, what lessons may be learned from what happened in Iran?

To carry out this study, several primary and secondary sources of data have been used: interviews, writings and declarations of the Shah and of Ayatollah Khomeini; personal accounts of persons who served in Iran; Iranian government documents and publications; U.S. government documents and publications; reports of private organizations; and several books, papers and articles written about Iran.

On the question concerning the contributions of the armed forces to the causes of the revolution, this study has found that the armed forces were involved in the following causes: brutality and other violations of human rights, corruption, economic hardships and excessive military expenditure, and cultural dislocation. However, I believe that the armed forces must be answerable only for the first two of these causes since these were the causes that the armed forces had control of. The Shah must answer for the last two causes.

During the riots and demonstrations, the armed forces' mishandling of the situation could be seen from the following patterns: use of unnecessary force, resort to "military half-measures," loss of credibility, failure to "feel the pulse" of the people, and breakdown of

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary

Although the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 took place a few years ago, it is still relevant to the present world. Whenever a government is in trouble, some people immediately relate that government's situation to the case of Iran, for there were circumstances of that case which are now found in many countries. A study of the military aspects of that revolution, particularly the role of the Iranian armed forces in the fall of the Shah, would then be useful to those countries and also to students of military art and science.

This study, therefore, has been conducted in order to answer the following questions: Did the Iranian armed forces do something that contributed to the causes which led the people of Iran to rise against the Shah? When the demonstrations and riots were staged, did the armed forces manage the situation properly, or did they do something instead that worsened the situation? When the period of

1979; Otto Von Pivka, Armies of the Middle East (1979), p. 164; Poursardie, "Conditions for Revolution," pp. 242-243; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 248-255; and The Sunday Times Journal (Manila), 11 February 1979.

52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.; The Times Journal (Manila), 13 February 1979; and Bulletin Today (Manila), 14 February 1979.
54. Ibid.
55. Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 251.
56. Apolonio Batalla, "Rich in Lessons," Bulletin Today (Manila), 11 February 1979, p. 6; and Reuters, "Collapse of Iran's Mighty Army Explained," Evening Post (Manila), 20 February 1979, p. 5.
57. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 527-528; Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 172; and The Sunday Times Journal (Manila), 11 February 1979, p. 1.

History, p. 173; Vance, "Iran, Cambodia, China" (11 January 1979), p. 1.

40. Keesing's, ibid. and The New York Times, 15 January 1979.
41. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, p. 526; Keesing's, ibid. and Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 172.
42. Khomeyni, "Khomeyni Interview on Islamic Revolutionary Movement" (1979), p. 10.
43. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, pp. 521-528; Poursanaie, "Conditions for Revolution," pp. 240-241; Sullivan, Mission to Iran, pp. 238-244; and The Sunday Times Journal (Manila), 11 February 1979.
44. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 27 July 1979, p. 29742; Poursanaie, ibid. p. 241, and The Times Journal (Manila), 22 January 1979.
45. Bulletin Today (Manila), 28 January 1979; Keesing's, ibid. and Philippines Sunday Express, 28 January 1979.
46. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 526; Keesing's, ibid. Poursanaie, "Conditions for Revolution," p. 241; and Sullivan, Mission to Iran, p. 248.
47. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p. 259.
48. Ibid. p. 260.
49. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 526-527; and Patrick Meney, "Iranian Army Makes Its Move," The Sunday Times Journal (Manila), 11 February 1979, p. 5. It should be noted that at about this time, there were still those who doubted that the armed forces would abandon the Shah. See for example Fred Halliday, "Can the Army Be Controlled?" New Statesman, Volume 97, 2 February 1979, pp. 140-141; and Leonard Binder, "Revolution in Iran: Red, White or Black," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, January 1979, pp. 52-55, cited in Iran, "Iranian Revolution," p. 2.
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51. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 528-529; Keesing's, ibid. p. 29744; The New York Times, 11-12 February

27. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 27 July 1979, p. 29740; Pahlavi, Answer to History, p. 166; Poursanide, ibid., pp. 238-239; and Sullivan, ibid., pp. 181-184.
28. Pahlavi, ibid., pp. 168-169; and Sullivan, ibid., pp. 186-190.
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